GHSA-QVWC-R3R6-HQ25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-16 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-18 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60 R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame: ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object: [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address: ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00

ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 ^ ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 ==================================================================

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48839"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T13:15:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()\n\nsyzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH\nand mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with\ngarbage in skb-\u003ecb[], triggering a too big copy [1]\n\nPresumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct\nmetadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure\nto clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.\n\nBUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489\nWrite of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631\n\nCPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255\n __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]\n kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459\n check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]\n kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189\n memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66\n memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]\n packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489\n sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]\n sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]\n sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]\n ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632\n ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674\n __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\nRIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29\nCode: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60\nR13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\naddr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:\n ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246\n\nthis frame has 1 object:\n [32, 160) \u0027addr\u0027\n\nMemory state around the buggy address:\n ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00\n\u003effffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3\n                                                                ^\n ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1\n ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00\n==================================================================",
  "id": "GHSA-qvwc-r3r6-hq25",
  "modified": "2024-07-18T18:31:42Z",
  "published": "2024-07-16T15:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48839"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/268dcf1f7b3193bc446ec3d14e08a240e9561e4d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70b7b3c055fd4a464da8da55ff4c1f84269f9b02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a055f5f2841f7522b44a2b1eccb1951b4b03d51a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33dd1e6693f80d805155b3f69c18c2f642915da"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1e27cda1e3c12b705875bb7e247a97168580e33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9d5772d60f8e7ef34e290f72fc20e3a4883e7d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef591b35176029fdefea38e8388ffa371e18f4b2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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