GHSA-QVQ7-5MPJ-HVWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: Dequeue pending mesh_send_sync entries on cancel
In send_cancel(), pending mesh_tx objects are removed from the hdev->mesh_pending list and freed via mesh_send_complete(). However, if a mesh transmission was already queued onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list via mesh_next(), the queued entry retains a raw pointer to mesh_tx.
When hci_cmd_sync_work later processes the entry, it attempts to execute mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete using the already freed mesh_tx pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by invoking hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the target mesh_tx before completing it. If the entry is found and dequeued, its destroy callback will complete and free the object; otherwise, mesh_send_complete() is called directly.
Additionally, ensure the transmission queue advances after cancellation or errors. In mesh_send_start_complete(), call mesh_next() on error unless err is -ECANCELED, because hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() holds hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock and calling mesh_next() synchronously would deadlock. Instead, advance the queue in send_cancel() once the lock is released and if no transmission is in progress.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98632"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:16Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: mgmt: Dequeue pending mesh_send_sync entries on cancel\n\nIn send_cancel(), pending mesh_tx objects are removed from the\nhdev-\u003emesh_pending list and freed via mesh_send_complete(). However, if\na mesh transmission was already queued onto hdev-\u003ecmd_sync_work_list via\nmesh_next(), the queued entry retains a raw pointer to mesh_tx.\n\nWhen hci_cmd_sync_work later processes the entry, it attempts to execute\nmesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete using\nthe already freed mesh_tx pointer, leading to a use-after-free.\n\nFix this by invoking hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the\ntarget mesh_tx before completing it. If the entry is found and dequeued,\nits destroy callback will complete and free the object; otherwise,\nmesh_send_complete() is called directly.\n\nAdditionally, ensure the transmission queue advances after cancellation\nor errors. In mesh_send_start_complete(), call mesh_next() on error\nunless err is -ECANCELED, because hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() holds\nhdev-\u003ecmd_sync_work_lock and calling mesh_next() synchronously would\ndeadlock. Instead, advance the queue in send_cancel() once the lock is\nreleased and if no transmission is in progress.",
"id": "GHSA-qvq7-5mpj-hvwr",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03ced4687fb79286be7fdee0fc58d2c74de3e7bb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/084be90948632a5a358821e687b11a14445aae76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2189a219397d8e73808a67c4aade837b635705da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/718a8ffa180d469f99ad4f746f00cafd39456415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71af682ba4692c2ed9ace4c3d4ca462ae368c029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f84e52829021d00bca8e067302f597c71af1f71a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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