GHSA-QVG3-FH9P-WJPX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state()
The get_wave_state() function for v9 trusts cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset values read directly from the MQD, which are written by GPU microcode and fully attacker-controlled on the CRIU-restore path (via AMDKFD_IOC_RESTORE_PROCESS with H3).
this leads to an unbounded copy_to_user() that can leak adjacent GTT/kernel memory. If offset > size, integer underflow produces a ~4 GiB read length, if size is set to 1 MiB against a 4 KiB allocation, we leak 1 MiB of adjacent kernel memory (other queues' MQDs, ring buffers, KASLR pointers).
Fix by clamping both cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size to the actual allocated buffer size (q->ctl_stack_size) and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset to the clamped size before performing arithmetic and copy_to_user().
This ensures we never read beyond the allocated kernel BO regardless of attacker-supplied MQD field values.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97496"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state()\n\nThe get_wave_state() function for v9 trusts cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size and\ncp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset values read directly from the MQD, which are\nwritten by GPU microcode and fully attacker-controlled on the\nCRIU-restore path (via AMDKFD_IOC_RESTORE_PROCESS with H3).\n\nthis leads to an unbounded copy_to_user() that can leak adjacent\nGTT/kernel memory. If offset \u003e size, integer underflow produces a ~4 GiB\nread length, if size is set to 1 MiB against a 4 KiB allocation, we leak\n1 MiB of adjacent kernel memory (other queues\u0027 MQDs, ring buffers, KASLR\npointers).\n\nFix by clamping both cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size to the actual allocated\nbuffer size (q-\u003ectl_stack_size) and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset to the\nclamped size before performing arithmetic and copy_to_user().\n\nThis ensures we never read beyond the allocated kernel BO regardless of\nattacker-supplied MQD field values.",
"id": "GHSA-qvg3-fh9p-wjpx",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:15Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ef144458f48d5589e36f1b3d83e83db2e5c5ba5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9183d974ddd5f09d029beaf359275ac20d4d5fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2bef0f168be46692a6b900916ff5da3771480ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec646686613d8ab05b282d1463a7baa49fd6b83b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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