GHSA-QRX8-25QR-5R7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 23:32 – Updated: 2026-06-16 23:32Impact
When @n8n/mcp-browser is run in HTTP transport mode, the MCP endpoint accepts session initialization and tool invocation requests without any authentication. Any network-reachable client, or any website visited by the user, can establish an MCP session and invoke browser-control tools.
Where the n8n AI Browser Bridge extension is installed and a browser connection is active, an unauthenticated caller can access browser-control capabilities including navigation, JavaScript evaluation, and cookie and storage access against the user's real browser profile.
This issue only affects instances where @n8n/mcp-browser is run with the HTTP transport (--transport http). The default transport is stdio, which is not affected.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.25.7, and 2.26.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Avoid running @n8n/mcp-browser with the HTTP transport; use the default stdio transport instead.
- If HTTP transport is required, restrict network access to the listening port to trusted clients only using host-based firewall rules.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54309"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T23:32:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\nWhen `@n8n/mcp-browser` is run in HTTP transport mode, the MCP endpoint accepts session initialization and tool invocation requests without any authentication. Any network-reachable client, or any website visited by the user, can establish an MCP session and invoke browser-control tools.\n\nWhere the n8n AI Browser Bridge extension is installed and a browser connection is active, an unauthenticated caller can access browser-control capabilities including navigation, JavaScript evaluation, and cookie and storage access against the user\u0027s real browser profile.\n\nThis issue only affects instances where `@n8n/mcp-browser` is run with the HTTP transport (`--transport http`). The default transport is stdio, which is not affected.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.25.7, and 2.26.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Avoid running `@n8n/mcp-browser` with the HTTP transport; use the default stdio transport instead.\n- If HTTP transport is required, restrict network access to the listening port to trusted clients only using host-based firewall rules.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
"id": "GHSA-qrx8-25qr-5r7v",
"modified": "2026-06-16T23:32:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T23:32:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-qrx8-25qr-5r7v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n: MCP Browser HTTP Transport Exposes Unauthenticated Browser-Control Sessions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.