GHSA-QRP4-C626-6HW2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-03 18:31Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in the operating system certificate bundle shipped in the Docker images of APM Server; Auditbeat, Filebeat, Heartbeat, Metricbeat and Packetbeat; Elastic Agent, including Fleet Server and Cloudbeat; Logstash, for TLS connections that use the operating system certificate bundle; Elastic connectors; Universal Profiling (host agent, collector and symbolizer); and Elastic Maps Server. This certificate bundle, a dependency of these products (Dependency on Vulnerable Third-Party Component, CWE-1395), could allow an attacker to intercept or modify TLS-protected traffic via Signature Spoofing by Key Theft (CAPEC-474). The certificate bundle includes root certificate authorities that signed eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities whose private keys are compromised. Anyone with these keys can issue a certificate for any host name that these products accept as trusted. Exploitation requires an attacker in a network position between the product and the remote party, who presents a certificate issued with one of the compromised keys.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T17:17:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in the operating system certificate bundle shipped in the Docker images of APM Server; Auditbeat, Filebeat, Heartbeat, Metricbeat and Packetbeat; Elastic Agent, including Fleet Server and Cloudbeat; Logstash, for TLS connections that use the operating system certificate bundle; Elastic connectors; Universal Profiling (host agent, collector and symbolizer); and Elastic Maps Server. This certificate bundle, a dependency of these products (Dependency on Vulnerable Third-Party Component, CWE-1395), could allow an attacker to intercept or modify TLS-protected traffic via Signature Spoofing by Key Theft (CAPEC-474). The certificate bundle includes root certificate authorities that signed eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities whose private keys are compromised. Anyone with these keys can issue a certificate for any host name that these products accept as trusted. Exploitation requires an attacker in a network position between the product and the remote party, who presents a certificate issued with one of the compromised keys.",
"id": "GHSA-qrp4-c626-6hw2",
"modified": "2026-11-03T18:31:07Z",
"published": "2026-11-03T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/multiple-elastic-docker-images-8-19-24-9-4-9-9-5-6-security-update-esa-2026-237/391374"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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