GHSA-QRMV-VC96-X8HW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: acquire vm_ctx->lock before mapping memory to GPU VM
The drm gpuvm code doesn't protect find operation against map operation, and the driver needs to ensure a map operation shouldn't happen when a find operation is in progress.
In some cases a find operation will be in progress when doing map/unmap operations, and the find operation will do a NULL pointer dereference.
An example of the stack trace of such NULL dereference is shown below:
Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines at
virtual address 0000000000000010
[<ffffffff01e989d4>] drm_gpuva_find+0x28/0x6c [drm_gpuvm]
[<ffffffff01ed3a40>] pvr_vm_unmap+0x34/0x68 [powervr]
[<ffffffff01ec69da>] pvr_ioctl_vm_unmap+0x2e/0x50 [powervr]
[<ffffffff8080ce0a>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x8e/0xdc
[<ffffffff8080d016>] drm_ioctl+0x1be/0x3e0
[<ffffffff802bec3e>] __riscv_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xc4
[<ffffffff80d858b2>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x23e/0x3f4
[<ffffffff80d92288>] handle_exception+0x168/0x174
As all occurences of drm_gpuva_find() are already guarded by vm_ctx->lock, make pvr_vm_map() to acquire this lock to prevent disturbing any find operation. This fixes the NULL deference problem in drm_gpuva_find().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/imagination: acquire vm_ctx-\u003elock before mapping memory to GPU VM\n\nThe drm gpuvm code doesn\u0027t protect find operation against map operation,\nand the driver needs to ensure a map operation shouldn\u0027t happen when a\nfind operation is in progress.\n\nIn some cases a find operation will be in progress when doing map/unmap\noperations, and the find operation will do a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nAn example of the stack trace of such NULL dereference is shown below:\n\n```\nUnable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines at\nvirtual address 0000000000000010\n\n[\u003cffffffff01e989d4\u003e] drm_gpuva_find+0x28/0x6c [drm_gpuvm]\n[\u003cffffffff01ed3a40\u003e] pvr_vm_unmap+0x34/0x68 [powervr]\n[\u003cffffffff01ec69da\u003e] pvr_ioctl_vm_unmap+0x2e/0x50 [powervr]\n[\u003cffffffff8080ce0a\u003e] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x8e/0xdc\n[\u003cffffffff8080d016\u003e] drm_ioctl+0x1be/0x3e0\n[\u003cffffffff802bec3e\u003e] __riscv_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xc4\n[\u003cffffffff80d858b2\u003e] do_trap_ecall_u+0x23e/0x3f4\n[\u003cffffffff80d92288\u003e] handle_exception+0x168/0x174\n```\n\nAs all occurences of drm_gpuva_find*() are already guarded by\nvm_ctx-\u003elock, make pvr_vm_map() to acquire this lock to prevent\ndisturbing any find operation. This fixes the NULL deference problem in\ndrm_gpuva_find*().",
"id": "GHSA-qrmv-vc96-x8hw",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15f58d44c24477a6ebffa44ec05207b81cfa55d9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17e2030f37600994440f875dc410615d5c66ee6d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f1f2618e44b21a7d4eb30d3bbd7e015ffbbbadf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6253bb56bb2ebdf317d8b599ce737a2510cc2e17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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