GHSA-QQJ3-G7MX-5P4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-21 20:25 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:30Impact
This vulnerability affects NeuVector deployments only when the Report anonymous cluster data option is enabled. When this option is enabled, NeuVector sends anonymous telemetry data to the telemetry server at https://upgrades.neuvector-upgrade-responder.livestock.rancher.io.
In affected versions, NeuVector does not enforce TLS certificate verification when transmitting anonymous cluster data to the telemetry server. As a result, the communication channel is susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where an attacker could intercept or modify the transmitted data. Additionally, NeuVector loads the response of the telemetry server is loaded into memory without size limitation, which makes it vulnerable to a Denial of Service(DoS) attack.
The patched version includes the following security improvements:
- NeuVector now verifies the telemetry server’s TLS certificate chain and hostname during the handshake process. This ensures that all telemetry communications occur over a trusted and verified channel.
- NeuVector limits the telemetry server’s response to 256 bytes, mitigating the risk of memory exhaustion and DoS attacks.
These security enhancements are enabled by default and require no user action.
Patches
Patched versions include release v5.4.7 and above.
Workarounds
If you cannot update to a patched version, you can temporarily disable the Report anonymous cluster data, which is enabled by default in NeuVector. To change this setting, go to Settings → Configuration → Report anonymous cluster data in the NeuVector UI.
Disabling this option prevents NeuVector from sending telemetry data to the telemetry server, which helps mitigate this vulnerability.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the NeuVector repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-20230727023453-1c4957d53911"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20251020133207-084a437033b4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54470"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-21T20:25:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-30T10:15:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis vulnerability affects NeuVector deployments only when the `Report anonymous cluster data option` is enabled. When this option is enabled, NeuVector sends anonymous telemetry data to the telemetry server at `https://upgrades.neuvector-upgrade-responder.livestock.rancher.io`.\n\nIn affected versions, NeuVector does not enforce TLS certificate verification when transmitting anonymous cluster data to the telemetry server. As a result, the communication channel is susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where an attacker could intercept or modify the transmitted data. Additionally, NeuVector loads the response of the telemetry server is loaded into memory without size limitation, which makes it vulnerable to a Denial of Service(DoS) attack. \n\nThe patched version includes the following security improvements:\n- NeuVector now verifies the telemetry server\u2019s `TLS certificate chain` and `hostname` during the handshake process. This ensures that all telemetry communications occur over a trusted and verified channel.\n- NeuVector limits the telemetry server\u2019s response to `256 bytes`, mitigating the risk of memory exhaustion and DoS attacks.\n\nThese security enhancements are enabled by default and require no user action.\n\n\n### Patches\nPatched versions include release **v5.4.7** and above.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot update to a patched version, you can temporarily disable the Report anonymous cluster data, which is enabled by default in NeuVector.\nTo change this setting, go to **Settings** \u2192 **Configuration** \u2192 **Report anonymous cluster data** in the NeuVector UI.\n\nDisabling this option prevents NeuVector from sending telemetry data to the telemetry server, which helps mitigate this vulnerability.\n\n\n### References\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Reach out to the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n- Open an issue in the [NeuVector](https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/issues/new/choose) repository.\n- Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-neuvector/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/neuvector-v-all-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/#suse-security).",
"id": "GHSA-qqj3-g7mx-5p4w",
"modified": "2026-07-02T20:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-10-21T20:25:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/security/advisories/GHSA-qqj3-g7mx-5p4w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/commit/06424701e69bf1eb76ff90180d78853fded93021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/commit/415737cbec581a5dc5f204fac1c78b7f29ad7dc2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2025-54470"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NeuVector telemetry sender is vulnerable to MITM and DoS"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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