GHSA-QQ85-P63R-6HWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Let driver decide buffer size at AMDKFD_IOC_GET_DMABUF_INFO ioctl
amdkfd driver needs allocate buffer to return bo metadata to user space. The buffer size is controlled by user currently. It is a potential security issue that hostile value (e.g. 2 GiB) lets any render-group user trigger order-MAX allocation/OOM in kernel context.
This patch first finds bo metadata size. If the size is smaller than user provided value drive can safely allocate buffer in kernel space and copy to user space buffer. If not, driver will let user know, not allocate and copy. User will redo with new buffer in user space.
This patch lets driver decide buffer allocation size to avoid potential hostile size from user space.
(cherry picked from commit f54ce9e8cbd3abe0eda3a285f54dc4f572fe589a)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93823"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdkfd: Let driver decide buffer size at AMDKFD_IOC_GET_DMABUF_INFO ioctl\n\namdkfd driver needs allocate buffer to return bo metadata to user space. The\nbuffer size is controlled by user currently. It is a potential security issue\nthat hostile value (e.g. 2 GiB) lets any render-group user trigger order-MAX\nallocation/OOM in kernel context.\n\nThis patch first finds bo metadata size. If the size is smaller than user\nprovided value drive can safely allocate buffer in kernel space and copy to\nuser space buffer. If not, driver will let user know, not allocate and copy.\nUser will redo with new buffer in user space.\n\nThis patch lets driver decide buffer allocation size to avoid potential hostile\nsize from user space.\n\n(cherry picked from commit f54ce9e8cbd3abe0eda3a285f54dc4f572fe589a)",
"id": "GHSA-qq85-p63r-6hwh",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:44Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d9fd0f01550aab4a0a1984b4379e50545906248"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8242a8d9d7194d5ef8a8b38a5621ca0966a3ec15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a65ccabde6deb95baf9442bd98299e2248884162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d298c100796b2cd1e7e75f8e615b79d034e510f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d51841bb5ceee75ec3aeeb4e5c51c8e5e7524228"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.