GHSA-QPFH-2WPM-C362
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-10 18:32 – Updated: 2025-04-10 18:32Spring Cloud Config Server may not use Vault token sent by clients using a X-CONFIG-TOKEN header when making requests to Vault. Your application may be affected by this if the following are true: * You have Spring Vault on the classpath of your Spring Cloud Config Server and * You are using the X-CONFIG-TOKEN header to send a Vault token to the Spring Cloud Config Server for the Config Server to use when making requests to Vault and * You are using the default Spring Vault SessionManager implementation LifecycleAwareSessionManager or a SessionManager implementation that persists the Vault token such as SimpleSessionManager.
In this case the SessionManager persists the first token it retrieves and will continue to use that token even if client requests to the Spring Cloud Config Server include a X-CONFIG-TOKEN header with a different value. Affected Spring Products and Versions Spring Cloud Config: * 2.2.1.RELEASE - 4.2.1
Mitigation Users of affected versions should upgrade to the corresponding fixed version.
Affected version(s)Fix versionAvailability4.2.x4.2.2OSS4.1.x4.1.6OSS4.0.x4.0.10Commercial3.1.x3.1.10Commercial3.0.x4.1.6OSS2.2.x4.1.6OSS NOTE: Spring Cloud Config 3.0.x and 2.2.x are no longer under open source or commercial support. Users of these versions are encouraged to upgrade to a supported version.
No other mitigation steps are necessary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-10T18:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Spring Cloud Config Server may not use Vault token sent by clients using a X-CONFIG-TOKEN\u00a0header when making requests to Vault.\nYour application may be affected by this if the following are true:\n * You have Spring Vault on the classpath of your Spring Cloud Config Server and\n * You are using the X-CONFIG-TOKEN\u00a0header to send a Vault token to the Spring Cloud Config Server for the Config Server to use when making requests to Vault and\n * You are using the default Spring Vault SessionManager\u00a0implementation LifecycleAwareSessionManager\u00a0or a SessionManager\u00a0implementation that persists the Vault token such as SimpleSessionManager.\n\nIn this case the SessionManager\u00a0persists the first token it retrieves and will continue to use that token even if client requests to the Spring Cloud Config Server include a X-CONFIG-TOKEN\u00a0header with a different value.\nAffected Spring Products and Versions\nSpring Cloud Config:\n * 2.2.1.RELEASE - 4.2.1\n\n\nMitigation\nUsers of affected versions should upgrade to the corresponding fixed version.\n\nAffected version(s)Fix versionAvailability4.2.x4.2.2OSS4.1.x4.1.6OSS4.0.x4.0.10Commercial3.1.x3.1.10Commercial3.0.x4.1.6OSS2.2.x4.1.6OSS\nNOTE: Spring Cloud Config 3.0.x and 2.2.x are no longer under open source or commercial support. Users of these versions are encouraged to upgrade to a supported version.\n\nNo other mitigation steps are necessary.",
"id": "GHSA-qpfh-2wpm-c362",
"modified": "2025-04-10T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2025-04-10T18:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2025-22232"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.