GHSA-QP8R-RQ4W-P4WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables
In __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect table and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level indirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a descriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the indirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again not counted, so the walk never makes forward progress.
Because count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every return to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips. A guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(), an uninterruptible host DoS.
Move the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a top-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step before the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under the existing vrh->vring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still charged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single table, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in tools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic indirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:09Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables\n\nIn __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect\ntable and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level\nindirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a\ndescriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the\nindirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again\nnot counted, so the walk never makes forward progress.\n\nBecause count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every\nreturn to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips.\nA guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(),\nan uninterruptible host DoS.\n\nMove the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a\ntop-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step\nbefore the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under\nthe existing vrh-\u003evring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still\ncharged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single\ntable, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in\ntools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic\nindirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.",
"id": "GHSA-qp8r-rq4w-p4wc",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d8fae59c6b00cb6b2d48e1496b8a4cc2f4d5e8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7d831fd55e61f76d5dafe4b5e53aa9c87f7c227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6b933a9a1ebf67ae5474bfb8824500457dfbb68"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f898439ace7f89922e853b43bcbfcd26ea2e0a98"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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