GHSA-QMVV-QMWQ-RGRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: wait for SRCU readers before splicing the namespace list
Readers walk ctrl->namespaces under ctrl->srcu, and some of them sleep there, e.g. nvme_wait_freeze() waiting for I/O to drain.
nvme_remove_namespaces() moves the list onto its on-stack ns_list with list_splice_init_rcu(), which only waits for RCU readers before relinking the entries. A reader still on the last namespace then follows its next pointer to ns_list instead of ctrl->namespaces and treats the stack as a namespace. Deleting a controller while a Format NVM passthrough waits for a delayed read on the last namespace gives:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nvme_wait_freeze+0x102/0x120 Read of size 8 at addr ff110001d2f3fc38 by task nvme/4413 Call Trace: nvme_wait_freeze nvme_passthru_start nvme_submit_user_cmd nvme_user_cmd nvme_dev_ioctl BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8af04850
Use list_splice_init_srcu() instead, which waits for the SRCU readers. This also takes the RCU grace period out of every controller deletion. Deleting 64 tcp controllers with one namespace each, median of 3 runs on each of two boots per kernel:
before after
nvme disconnect-all (ms) 3491 / 3509 2996 / 3165 nvme_remove_namespaces() avg (ms) 39.0 / 40.5 31.9 / 34.7
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99596"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:17:51Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: wait for SRCU readers before splicing the namespace list\n\nReaders walk ctrl-\u003enamespaces under ctrl-\u003esrcu, and some of them sleep\nthere, e.g. nvme_wait_freeze() waiting for I/O to drain.\n\nnvme_remove_namespaces() moves the list onto its on-stack ns_list with\nlist_splice_init_rcu(), which only waits for RCU readers before\nrelinking the entries. A reader still on the last namespace then follows\nits next pointer to ns_list instead of ctrl-\u003enamespaces and treats the\nstack as a namespace. Deleting a controller while a Format NVM\npassthrough waits for a delayed read on the last namespace gives:\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nvme_wait_freeze+0x102/0x120\n Read of size 8 at addr ff110001d2f3fc38 by task nvme/4413\n Call Trace:\n nvme_wait_freeze\n nvme_passthru_start\n nvme_submit_user_cmd\n nvme_user_cmd\n nvme_dev_ioctl\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8af04850\n\nUse list_splice_init_srcu() instead, which waits for the SRCU readers.\nThis also takes the RCU grace period out of every controller deletion.\nDeleting 64 tcp controllers with one namespace each, median of 3 runs on\neach of two boots per kernel:\n\n before after\n nvme disconnect-all (ms) 3491 / 3509 2996 / 3165\n nvme_remove_namespaces() avg (ms) 39.0 / 40.5 31.9 / 34.7",
"id": "GHSA-qmvv-qmwq-rgrr",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:03Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99596"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38e604a8271ea9fd4add6669de73cc72da8184ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a0449832b50cd4f99f2d2952cfc1476e5f26d0f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7f566c0c354109ea565ef29afdf23005b2d48dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eec7caddb4d152c72a7b6975c6e3f5589cddbdd4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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