GHSA-QJMQ-CHG2-32XR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-17 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()

A NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a QCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).

[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)

[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth] [ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80

The issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump packet is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly forwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on success). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or btusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it to hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.

Later, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump queue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.

Fix this by: 1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno on failure, consistent with kernel conventions. 2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL and event packets for better structure and readability.

This ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding double handling and preventing NULL pointer access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-37918"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-20T16:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()\n\nA NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a\nQCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).\n\n[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)\n\n[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008\n[ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth]\n[ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80\n\nThe issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump\npacket is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly\nforwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on\nsuccess). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or\nbtusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it\nto hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.\n\nLater, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump\nqueue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFix this by:\n1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno\n   on failure, consistent with kernel conventions.\n2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL\n   and event packets for better structure and readability.\n\nThis ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding\ndouble handling and preventing NULL pointer access.",
  "id": "GHSA-qjmq-chg2-32xr",
  "modified": "2025-11-17T18:30:23Z",
  "published": "2025-05-20T18:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37918"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0317b033abcd1d8dd2798f0e2de5e84543d0bd22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e8d44ebaa7babdd5c5ab50ca275826e241920d6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8563d9fabd8a4b726ba7acab4737c438bf11a059"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b70b41591ec48c78ec6a885e1f57bfc4029e5e13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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