GHSA-QHXG-623C-CFJM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:03 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:03
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Plaintext Password Comparison in Shared Views
Details

Summary

The shared-view password check fell back to strict-equality (===) comparison for legacy plaintext passwords, leaking the password's length and per-character prefix through response timing.

Details

The bcrypt branch (hashes starting with $2a$/$2b$) was unaffected. The legacy fallback in View.ts now uses crypto.timingSafeEqual and a same-length dummy compare on the length-mismatch path, so total comparison time is approximately length-independent. The EE dashboard model's verifyPassword is patched the same way.

Impact

A network-positioned attacker could mount a timing oracle against shared views whose passwords predated the bcrypt migration. Exploitation requires the ability to time shared-view authentication responses but no prior authentication.

Credit

This issue was reported by @Proscan-one.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.05.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.05.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47379"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-203"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:03:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe shared-view password check fell back to strict-equality (`===`) comparison for\nlegacy plaintext passwords, leaking the password\u0027s length and per-character prefix\nthrough response timing.\n\n### Details\nThe bcrypt branch (hashes starting with `$2a$`/`$2b$`) was unaffected. The legacy\nfallback in `View.ts` now uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual` and a same-length dummy\ncompare on the length-mismatch path, so total comparison time is approximately\nlength-independent. The EE dashboard model\u0027s `verifyPassword` is patched the same way.\n\n### Impact\nA network-positioned attacker could mount a timing oracle against shared views whose\npasswords predated the bcrypt migration. Exploitation requires the ability to time\nshared-view authentication responses but no prior authentication.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by [@Proscan-one](https://github.com/Proscan-one).",
  "id": "GHSA-qhxg-623c-cfjm",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T16:03:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T16:03:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-qhxg-623c-cfjm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.05.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Plaintext Password Comparison in Shared Views"
}


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