GHSA-QH8J-HQJV-7M4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 23:29 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:29
VLAI
Summary
Astro: Malformed port in the Host header can crash the Node adapter
Details

Summary

In the Astro Node adapter, a request whose Host header contains a malformed port (for example example.com:65536 or example.com:8080:8080) produced an invalid request URL. The fallback intended to recover from an unparseable URL reused the same malformed host, so it failed again and raised an uncaught TypeError: Invalid URL while the request was being built, before any route ran.

Impact

The effect depends on the adapter configuration:

  • Default configuration (standalone): the request returns 500 Internal Server Error and the server continues running.
  • With the opt-in staticHeaders: true option: the throw reaches a synchronous HTTP handler that does not catch it, becoming an uncaughtException that terminates the process.

This is an availability-only issue. It does not expose data or allow code execution. Triggering it requires sending a hand-crafted Host header, and many proxies and CDNs reject malformed hosts before they reach the origin.

Affected versions

@astrojs/node <= 11.1.2.

Patches

Fixed in @astrojs/node 11.1.3. When the incoming host cannot be parsed, the request URL now degrades to a host the server controls, so the request is handled instead of throwing. Hosts carrying more than a single hostname:port pair are also rejected during host validation.

Workarounds

Upgrade to @astrojs/node 11.1.3 or later. Deployments that terminate malformed Host headers at a reverse proxy or CDN are not reachable through this path.

Credits

Reported by @Celggar.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@astrojs/node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102984"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:29:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T15:22:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn the Astro Node adapter, a request whose `Host` header contains a malformed port (for example `example.com:65536` or `example.com:8080:8080`) produced an invalid request URL. The fallback intended to recover from an unparseable URL reused the same malformed host, so it failed again and raised an uncaught `TypeError: Invalid URL` while the request was being built, before any route ran.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe effect depends on the adapter configuration:\n\n- Default configuration (`standalone`): the request returns `500 Internal Server Error` and the server continues running.\n- With the opt-in `staticHeaders: true` option: the throw reaches a synchronous HTTP handler that does not catch it, becoming an `uncaughtException` that terminates the process.\n\nThis is an availability-only issue. It does not expose data or allow code execution. Triggering it requires sending a hand-crafted `Host` header, and many proxies and CDNs reject malformed hosts before they reach the origin.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@astrojs/node` \u003c= 11.1.2.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@astrojs/node` 11.1.3. When the incoming host cannot be parsed, the request URL now degrades to a host the server controls, so the request is handled instead of throwing. Hosts carrying more than a single `hostname:port` pair are also rejected during host validation.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `@astrojs/node` 11.1.3 or later. Deployments that terminate malformed `Host` headers at a reverse proxy or CDN are not reachable through this path.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @Celggar.",
  "id": "GHSA-qh8j-hqjv-7m4x",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T23:29:40Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T23:29:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-qh8j-hqjv-7m4x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102984"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17572"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/2066f39c60707a100531b4ef4bb5dab8feafa7f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@astrojs/node@11.1.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Astro: Malformed port in the Host header can crash the Node adapter"
}



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