GHSA-QH4W-V3W8-H422
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-19 12:30 – Updated: 2024-12-30 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: Fix oops when HEVC init fails
The stateless HEVC decoder saves the instance pointer in the context regardless if the initialization worked or not. This caused a use after free, when the pointer is freed in case of a failure in the deinit function. Only store the instance pointer when the initialization was successful, to solve this issue.
Hardware name: Acer Tomato (rev3 - 4) board (DT) pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec] lr : vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec] sp : ffff80008750bc20 x29: ffff80008750bc20 x28: ffff1299f6d70000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff80008750bc98 x22: 000000000000a003 x21: ffffd45c4cfae000 x20: 0000000000000010 x19: ffff1299fd668310 x18: 000000000000001a x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffd45cb15dc648 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffff1299c08da1c0 x13: ffffd45cb1f87a10 x12: ffffd45cb2f5fe80 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000001b30 x9 : ffffd45c4d12b488 x8 : 1fffe25339380d81 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff1299c9c06c00 x5 : 0000000000000132 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000010 x1 : ffff80008750bc98 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec] vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec] vpu_dec_deinit+0x1c/0x30 [mtk_vcodec_dec] vdec_hevc_slice_deinit+0x30/0x98 [mtk_vcodec_dec] vdec_if_deinit+0x38/0x68 [mtk_vcodec_dec] mtk_vcodec_dec_release+0x20/0x40 [mtk_vcodec_dec] fops_vcodec_release+0x64/0x118 [mtk_vcodec_dec] v4l2_release+0x7c/0x100 __fput+0x80/0x2d8 __fput_sync+0x58/0x70 __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x38/0xd8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8 el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0 Code: d503201f f9401660 b900127f b900227f (f9400400)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T11:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: mediatek: vcodec: Fix oops when HEVC init fails\n\nThe stateless HEVC decoder saves the instance pointer in the context\nregardless if the initialization worked or not. This caused a use after\nfree, when the pointer is freed in case of a failure in the deinit\nfunction.\nOnly store the instance pointer when the initialization was successful,\nto solve this issue.\n\n Hardware name: Acer Tomato (rev3 - 4) board (DT)\n pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n lr : vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n sp : ffff80008750bc20\n x29: ffff80008750bc20 x28: ffff1299f6d70000 x27: 0000000000000000\n x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000\n x23: ffff80008750bc98 x22: 000000000000a003 x21: ffffd45c4cfae000\n x20: 0000000000000010 x19: ffff1299fd668310 x18: 000000000000001a\n x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffd45cb15dc648 x15: 0000000000000000\n x14: ffff1299c08da1c0 x13: ffffd45cb1f87a10 x12: ffffd45cb2f5fe80\n x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000001b30 x9 : ffffd45c4d12b488\n x8 : 1fffe25339380d81 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff1299c9c06c00\n x5 : 0000000000000132 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000010 x1 : ffff80008750bc98 x0 : 0000000000000000\n Call trace:\n vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n vpu_dec_deinit+0x1c/0x30 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n vdec_hevc_slice_deinit+0x30/0x98 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n vdec_if_deinit+0x38/0x68 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n mtk_vcodec_dec_release+0x20/0x40 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n fops_vcodec_release+0x64/0x118 [mtk_vcodec_dec]\n v4l2_release+0x7c/0x100\n __fput+0x80/0x2d8\n __fput_sync+0x58/0x70\n __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0\n do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n el0_svc+0x38/0xd8\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8\n el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0\n Code: d503201f f9401660 b900127f b900227f (f9400400)",
"id": "GHSA-qh4w-v3w8-h422",
"modified": "2024-12-30T21:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-05-19T12:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/521ce0ea7418298d754494fe53263c23c4c78a8e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97c75ee5de060d271d80109b0c47cb6008439e5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec25fc3c2c1e8958a51abcfed614f81446d918c4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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