GHSA-QGRH-X7HC-R5H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding
ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH) while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.
When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset() remained negative.
This led to two problems: 1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset() to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic. 2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.
Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb) to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98096"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding\n\nipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb-\u003edata at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)\nwhile skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.\n\nWhen segments_left \u003e 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb-\u003edata\nposition by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately\nfollowed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a\nHop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()\nremained negative.\n\nThis led to two problems:\n1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes\n __skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()\n to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.\n2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream\n handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative\n offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.\n\nFix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring\nskb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as\ndownstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)\nto restore skb-\u003edata to the SRH before looping back.",
"id": "GHSA-qgrh-x7hc-r5h3",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ad7dca5e03bd64c65983a19734337512fd75491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f44d4160bcdb3136a9145a4b9c7816382976925"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/975b5b067f525a1b1338c4a3bee1c46545801518"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97b21ef57dfabbff660a4672c9fef7edfb720f47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cfbe2c381ab6d00a08e7a5b6028865adfb4e1bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af08f62b5a5a446d6134a92d86771d3d12e0e3da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce4c8beedc19aceeab0e7bdc6f34394fb158c47c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f463c4786cf27376de7dfc0833a12e924a98f698"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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