GHSA-QFC6-3G3R-6RJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
locking/lockdep: Invalidate stale class_cache entries for zapped classes
syzbot reported a lockdep splat hitting DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) in hlock_class() due to an invalid class_idx:
WARNING: kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 at __lock_acquire+0x382/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg0 wg_packet_tx_worker RIP: 0010:hlock_class kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4870 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x389/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5886 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:173 tcp_tsq_handler+0x29/0x200 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1291 tcp_tsq_workfn+0x384/0x410 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1325 ...
When a lock class is zapped (e.g. during module unload or key unregistration), zap_class() clears the class's bit in lock_classes_in_use and removes it from the class hash table. However, existing lockdep_map instances embedded in data structures may still retain a pointer to the zapped class in their class_cache[] array.
When __lock_acquire() subsequently runs on such a lock, it finds lock->class_cache[subclass] != NULL, skipping register_lock_class() and assigning hlock->class_idx to the index of the zapped class. When check_wait_context() or hlock_class() inspects the held_lock, it finds !test_bit(class_idx, lock_classes_in_use) and warns. Furthermore, if the zapped slot is subsequently re-allocated to an unrelated lock key, the stale class_cache entry would erroneously match the unrelated class (ABA issue).
Add lock_class_cache_is_valid() to validate that the cached class is within lock_classes bounds, still allocated in lock_classes_in_use (using uninstrumented arch_test_bit() in __always_inline context so it is safe in noinstr contexts like match_held_lock()), and that class->key matches the expected subkey (taking lockdep_set_subclass() overrides into account). Also use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() when accessing class_cache[]. If the entry is invalid or stale, fall back to register_lock_class() / look_up_lock_class().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T14:17:50Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlocking/lockdep: Invalidate stale class_cache entries for zapped classes\n\nsyzbot reported a lockdep splat hitting DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) in\nhlock_class() due to an invalid class_idx:\n\n WARNING: kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 at __lock_acquire+0x382/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203\n Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg0 wg_packet_tx_worker\n RIP: 0010:hlock_class kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4870 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x389/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5886\n _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:173\n tcp_tsq_handler+0x29/0x200 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1291\n tcp_tsq_workfn+0x384/0x410 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1325\n ...\n\nWhen a lock class is zapped (e.g. during module unload or key\nunregistration), zap_class() clears the class\u0027s bit in\nlock_classes_in_use and removes it from the class hash table.\nHowever, existing lockdep_map instances embedded in data structures\nmay still retain a pointer to the zapped class in their class_cache[]\narray.\n\nWhen __lock_acquire() subsequently runs on such a lock, it finds\nlock-\u003eclass_cache[subclass] != NULL, skipping register_lock_class()\nand assigning hlock-\u003eclass_idx to the index of the zapped class. When\ncheck_wait_context() or hlock_class() inspects the held_lock, it finds\n!test_bit(class_idx, lock_classes_in_use) and warns. Furthermore, if\nthe zapped slot is subsequently re-allocated to an unrelated lock key,\nthe stale class_cache entry would erroneously match the unrelated\nclass (ABA issue).\n\nAdd lock_class_cache_is_valid() to validate that the cached class is\nwithin lock_classes bounds, still allocated in lock_classes_in_use\n(using uninstrumented arch_test_bit() in __always_inline context so it\nis safe in noinstr contexts like match_held_lock()), and that\nclass-\u003ekey matches the expected subkey (taking lockdep_set_subclass()\noverrides into account). Also use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() when\naccessing class_cache[]. If the entry is invalid or stale, fall back\nto register_lock_class() / look_up_lock_class().",
"id": "GHSA-qfc6-3g3r-6rjj",
"modified": "2026-10-14T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-10-14T15:32:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02c6be7d675b21d81f0ba3a524346850a8c0e3bf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c9d664e2e067fca69e5a41d68e23bbc66a583fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bc345f6d81ebe22e0f355c2a21d7e29691f9332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa320fbb2f9fea50f5632a307da8ce84fbef5bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7acfb04c7e2e2dea248282b21373d93296644dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f63c86e9d267629758adaba18579e784ddd63c32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8a1281ab82df5b51fd0384354d4b21daf2b7af0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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