GHSA-QF2F-RV74-7C9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-28 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries: Fix dtl_access_lock to be a rw_semaphore
The dtl_access_lock needs to be a rw_sempahore, a sleeping lock, because the code calls kmalloc() while holding it, which can sleep:
# echo 1 > /proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:337 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 199, name: sh preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 3 locks held by sh/199: #0: c00000000a0743f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x324/0x438 #1: c0000000028c7058 (dtl_enable_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0xd4/0x5f4 #2: c0000000028c70b8 (dtl_access_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x220/0x5f4 CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4 #152 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x148 (unreliable) __might_resched+0x174/0x410 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x340/0x3d0 alloc_dtl_buffers+0x124/0x1ac vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x2a8/0x5f4 proc_reg_write+0xf4/0x150 vfs_write+0xfc/0x438 ksys_write+0x88/0x148 system_call_exception+0x1c4/0x5a0 system_call_common+0xf4/0x258
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56701"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-28T10:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/pseries: Fix dtl_access_lock to be a rw_semaphore\n\nThe dtl_access_lock needs to be a rw_sempahore, a sleeping lock, because\nthe code calls kmalloc() while holding it, which can sleep:\n\n # echo 1 \u003e /proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats\n BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:337\n in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 199, name: sh\n preempt_count: 1, expected: 0\n 3 locks held by sh/199:\n #0: c00000000a0743f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x324/0x438\n #1: c0000000028c7058 (dtl_enable_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0xd4/0x5f4\n #2: c0000000028c70b8 (dtl_access_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x220/0x5f4\n CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4 #152\n Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x148 (unreliable)\n __might_resched+0x174/0x410\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x340/0x3d0\n alloc_dtl_buffers+0x124/0x1ac\n vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x2a8/0x5f4\n proc_reg_write+0xf4/0x150\n vfs_write+0xfc/0x438\n ksys_write+0x88/0x148\n system_call_exception+0x1c4/0x5a0\n system_call_common+0xf4/0x258",
"id": "GHSA-qf2f-rv74-7c9g",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:01Z",
"published": "2024-12-28T12:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/525e18f1ba7c2b098c8ba587fb397efb34a6574c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6956c0e7346ce1bbfc726755aa8da10d26e84276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a246daa26b717e755ccc9061f47f7cd1c0b358dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b125d0cf1adde7b2b47d7337fed7e9133eea3463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cadae3a45d23aa4f6485938a67cbc47aaaa25e38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6ec133668757f84e5143f1eb141fd0b83778b9e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa5b5ea257135e771b489c83a2e93b5935d0108e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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