GHSA-Q97C-P368-75C4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:15 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:15For a model whose vocabulary size is an exact multiple of the embedding padding size (64) — e.g. any Llama-2-family model, vocab 32000 — a single request carrying a pre-tokenized prompt with token id equal to the vocab size (32000) passes vLLM's input-id validation but is one past the last embedding row. At tensor-parallel size 1 the embedding lookup does not mask indices, so the id reaches F.embedding out of range and raises a CUDA device-side assert, which poisons the engine's CUDA context and takes the engine down. Any client that can send pre-tokenized input (/v1/completions with prompt as token ids, /tokenize-fed flows, or the kv_transfer_params["prompt_token_ids"] reuse path) can trigger it.
Root cause
vllm/v1/engine/input_processor.py accepts a token id when id <= max(tokenizer.max_token_id, model_config.get_vocab_size() - 1).
vllm/tokenizers/hf.py computes max_token_id = max(max(vocab.values()), tokenizer.vocab_size). For Llama-2 tokenizers max(vocab.values()) = 31999 but tokenizer.vocab_size = 32000, so max_token_id = 32000 — one greater than the largest valid id.
The engine bound therefore becomes max(32000, 31999) = 32000, and id 32000 is accepted.
The model's embedding has pad_vocab_size(32000, 64) = 32000 rows (no padding), valid indices 0..31999. At VocabParallelEmbedding.forward with tp_size == 1 there is no masking, so index 32000 hits F.embedding out of range.
Affected
- tp=1 (single GPU per model — common per-copy layout). tp>1 masks via
get_masked_input_and_mask, so the id is clamped, not an OOB — likely wrong output rather than a crash. - Models whose vocab is a multiple of 64 with
tokenizer.vocab_sizeone past the max real id (Llama-2 family, vocab 32000, is the clear case). Qwen2.5 is NOT affected (padded headroom).
Suggested fix
max_token_id in vllm/tokenizers/hf.py now uses tokenizer.vocab_size - 1, so an id equal to the vocabulary size fails input validation instead of reaching the embedding. Fixed in MR59491, released in v0.32.0.
Reporter
Shijie Lyu (GitHub shijie-lyu lshjhf@gmail.com). Reported privately per SECURITY.
This advisory was fixed in MR59491.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129",
"CWE-193"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T21:15:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T18:17:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "For a model whose vocabulary size is an exact multiple of the embedding padding size (64) \u2014 e.g. any Llama-2-family model, vocab 32000 \u2014 a single request carrying a pre-tokenized prompt with token id equal to the vocab size (32000) passes vLLM\u0027s input-id validation but is one past the last embedding row. At tensor-parallel size 1 the embedding lookup does not mask indices, so the id reaches `F.embedding` out of range and raises a CUDA device-side assert, which poisons the engine\u0027s CUDA context and takes the engine down. Any client that can send pre-tokenized input (`/v1/completions` with `prompt` as token ids, `/tokenize`-fed flows, or the `kv_transfer_params[\"prompt_token_ids\"]` reuse path) can trigger it.\n\n## Root cause\n`vllm/v1/engine/input_processor.py` accepts a token id when `id \u003c= max(tokenizer.max_token_id, model_config.get_vocab_size() - 1)`.\n`vllm/tokenizers/hf.py` computes `max_token_id = max(max(vocab.values()), tokenizer.vocab_size)`. For Llama-2 tokenizers `max(vocab.values()) = 31999` but `tokenizer.vocab_size = 32000`, so `max_token_id = 32000` \u2014 one greater than the largest valid id.\nThe engine bound therefore becomes `max(32000, 31999) = 32000`, and id 32000 is accepted.\nThe model\u0027s embedding has `pad_vocab_size(32000, 64) = 32000` rows (no padding), valid indices 0..31999. At `VocabParallelEmbedding.forward` with `tp_size == 1` there is no masking, so index 32000 hits `F.embedding` out of range.\n\n## Affected\n- tp=1 (single GPU per model \u2014 common per-copy layout). tp\u003e1 masks via `get_masked_input_and_mask`, so the id is clamped, not an OOB \u2014 likely wrong output rather than a crash.\n- Models whose vocab is a multiple of 64 with `tokenizer.vocab_size` one past the max real id (Llama-2 family, vocab 32000, is the clear case). Qwen2.5 is NOT affected (padded headroom).\n\n## Suggested fix \nmax_token_id in vllm/tokenizers/hf.py now uses tokenizer.vocab_size - 1, so an id equal to the vocabulary size fails input validation instead of reaching the embedding. Fixed in [MR59491](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/59491), released in v0.32.0.\n\n## Reporter\nShijie Lyu (GitHub shijie-lyu lshjhf@gmail.com). Reported privately per SECURITY.\n\nThis advisory was fixed in [MR59491](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/59491).",
"id": "GHSA-q97c-p368-75c4",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:15:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T21:15:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-q97c-p368-75c4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/59491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/37cecc8141e2dcba9dd534897a164d4baaf27229"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Out-of-vocabulary prompt token id passes input validation and triggers a CUDA device-side assert (engine crash / DoS)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.