GHSA-Q87Q-QG4H-VWFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: ipu-bridge: Fix use-after-free in IVSC error path

ipu_bridge_get_ivsc_acpi_dev() returns an ACPI device with a reference held. If no matching CSI device is found, ipu_bridge_check_ivsc_dev() drops that reference before passing the device to dev_err(). Concurrent CSI device and ACPI namespace removal can drop the other references, making this the final put. dev_err() then reads the freed struct acpi_device and its kobject name.

This was reproduced without kprobes by racing normal CSI platform-device unregistration and ACPI configfs table removal against the production ipu_bridge_init() entry. KASAN reported the final free through device_release(), followed by invalid reads through _dev_err().

Emit the error message while the lookup reference is still held, then drop the reference as before.

Source reproducers and vulnerable/fixed serial logs, with only the build hostname redacted, are available at: https://github.com/kimaiden1984-boop/linux-ipu-bridge-acpi-uaf-reproducer

The fixed target builds with W=1 on x86-64. This was not tested on physical IPU hardware. The tests establish runtime reachability but do not measure occurrence frequency on shipping systems or establish exploitability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: ipu-bridge: Fix use-after-free in IVSC error path\n\nipu_bridge_get_ivsc_acpi_dev() returns an ACPI device with a reference\nheld. If no matching CSI device is found, ipu_bridge_check_ivsc_dev()\ndrops that reference before passing the device to dev_err(). Concurrent\nCSI device and ACPI namespace removal can drop the other references,\nmaking this the final put. dev_err() then reads the freed struct\nacpi_device and its kobject name.\n\nThis was reproduced without kprobes by racing normal CSI platform-device\nunregistration and ACPI configfs table removal against the production\nipu_bridge_init() entry. KASAN reported the final free through\ndevice_release(), followed by invalid reads through _dev_err().\n\nEmit the error message while the lookup reference is still held, then\ndrop the reference as before.\n\nSource reproducers and vulnerable/fixed serial logs, with only the build\nhostname redacted, are available at:\nhttps://github.com/kimaiden1984-boop/linux-ipu-bridge-acpi-uaf-reproducer\n\nThe fixed target builds with W=1 on x86-64. This was not tested on\nphysical IPU hardware. The tests establish runtime reachability but do\nnot measure occurrence frequency on shipping systems or establish\nexploitability.",
  "id": "GHSA-q87q-qg4h-vwfg",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99508"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2af4892580167181c3181b2f0b6ffab1be0096c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d42d1c82717f0853379b516a7fab54b636e09cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adf422b7587bff1c9069406ce7a6c5a1f0e70193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1df2ec20a6ddac6ae553b34b39472a20c5de9c6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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