GHSA-Q832-3WHF-9W63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: require the dentry lease record to cover struct ceph_mds_reply_lease

parse_reply_info_lease() reads a 32-bit struct_len off the wire and only checks that many bytes are present, without requiring struct_len to cover sizeof(struct ceph_mds_reply_lease) (10 bytes). A malicious MDS can declare a shorter record and still get the pointer published: the following *p += sizeof(**lease) overshoot is undone by *p = lend, so nothing downstream rejects the reply. ceph_fill_trace() -> update_dentry_lease() then reads 10 bytes through that pointer on any lookup on a mounted CephFS, running past the end of the message front.

Require the record to cover the structure, matching the sibling parse_reply_info_dir(). A conforming MDS always encodes the full 10 bytes.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459) Read of size 4 at addr ffff888026c63d65 by task kworker/0:3/2366 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459) ceph_fill_trace (fs/ceph/inode.c:1474 fs/ceph/inode.c:1823) mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:4229 fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7225) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

The buggy address is located 357 bytes inside of allocated 360-byte region [ffff888026c63c00, ffff888026c63d68)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99307"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:05Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: require the dentry lease record to cover struct ceph_mds_reply_lease\n\nparse_reply_info_lease() reads a 32-bit struct_len off the wire and only\nchecks that many bytes are present, without requiring struct_len to cover\nsizeof(struct ceph_mds_reply_lease) (10 bytes).  A malicious MDS can\ndeclare a shorter record and still get the pointer published: the\nfollowing *p += sizeof(**lease) overshoot is undone by *p = lend, so\nnothing downstream rejects the reply.  ceph_fill_trace() -\u003e\nupdate_dentry_lease() then reads 10 bytes through that pointer on any\nlookup on a mounted CephFS, running past the end of the message front.\n\nRequire the record to cover the structure, matching the sibling\nparse_reply_info_dir().  A conforming MDS always encodes the full 10\nbytes.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459)\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888026c63d65 by task kworker/0:3/2366\n  Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn\n  Call Trace:\n   __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459)\n   ceph_fill_trace (fs/ceph/inode.c:1474 fs/ceph/inode.c:1823)\n   mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:4229 fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7225)\n   ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)\n   ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)\n   ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)\n   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)\n   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)\n   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)\n\n  The buggy address is located 357 bytes inside of\n   allocated 360-byte region [ffff888026c63c00, ffff888026c63d68)",
  "id": "GHSA-q832-3whf-9w63",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99307"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/058e1c38722a6d5b0181f38fdec03d5da95c3ad1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/380bc69a0dbc50549cb196da40409aed69c84cfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ab17ed54e8b7ca64a8d167a09d6a2c865ed51cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7286b2ffe04d4b39b4e9884f714792589d94f316"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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