GHSA-Q756-C8H3-5XFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate AppInstanceId takeover target

AppInstanceId lookup currently selects the first open with the matching identifier. CREATE for an unrelated share or path can therefore force-close another session's open before authorization of the new target. Matching only the base path also conflates alternate data streams with the unnamed stream.

MS-SMB2 requires the old open to match the share and path, belong to a different ClientGuid, and be closed only when the requester has GENERIC_READ access. Search all opens with the ID and match share, resolved path, stream, and the current connection's client GUID. Retain a share configuration reference in ksmbd_file and reuse its name instead of allocating a name for every open. This keeps matching safe during tree connection teardown and preserves name-based matching across configuration updates.

Refresh the share reference on durable reconnect and restore the old reference if reopening fails. Serialize connection and share comparisons with durable disconnect/reconnect, and recheck the target before closing it. Keep the original ClientGuid for durable replay and lease checks.

Check AppInstanceVersion before querying access, even when GENERIC_READ is absent, and before disconnected delete-on-close cleanup. Rejected CREATE must leave other durable opens untouched. Calculate maximal access on the matched open's referenced path so a rename cannot substitute another file's authorization. Require read access with the effective VFS credentials as well as the NT DACL before takeover. Access denial only skips takeover and leaves CREATE to its normal access checks. Restore filesystem credentials before returning a takeover error.

Handle takeover before checking FILE_CREATE collisions, and re-resolve the path after closing the old open. This lets delete-on-close remove the old file before a new one is created. Include SYNCHRONIZE in the baseline maximal-access mask so read-only files report GENERIC_READ correctly.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99533"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:09Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: validate AppInstanceId takeover target\n\nAppInstanceId lookup currently selects the first open with the matching\nidentifier. CREATE for an unrelated share or path can therefore\nforce-close another session\u0027s open before authorization of the new\ntarget. Matching only the base path also conflates alternate data streams\nwith the unnamed stream.\n\nMS-SMB2 requires the old open to match the share and path, belong to a\ndifferent ClientGuid, and be closed only when the requester has\nGENERIC_READ access. Search all opens with the ID and match share,\nresolved path, stream, and the current connection\u0027s client GUID. Retain a\nshare configuration reference in ksmbd_file and reuse its name instead of\nallocating a name for every open. This keeps matching safe during tree\nconnection teardown and preserves name-based matching across configuration\nupdates.\n\nRefresh the share reference on durable reconnect and restore the old\nreference if reopening fails. Serialize connection and share comparisons\nwith durable disconnect/reconnect, and recheck the target before closing\nit. Keep the original ClientGuid for durable replay and lease checks.\n\nCheck AppInstanceVersion before querying access, even when GENERIC_READ\nis absent, and before disconnected delete-on-close cleanup. Rejected\nCREATE must leave other durable opens untouched. Calculate maximal access\non the matched open\u0027s referenced path so a rename cannot substitute another\nfile\u0027s authorization. Require read access with the effective VFS\ncredentials as well as the NT DACL before takeover. Access denial only\nskips takeover and leaves CREATE to its normal access checks. Restore\nfilesystem credentials before returning a takeover error.\n\nHandle takeover before checking FILE_CREATE collisions, and re-resolve\nthe path after closing the old open. This lets delete-on-close remove the\nold file before a new one is created. Include SYNCHRONIZE in the baseline\nmaximal-access mask so read-only files report GENERIC_READ correctly.",
  "id": "GHSA-q756-c8h3-5xfp",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/896ecf714703f6801af43b6d3db4b824d8a12286"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0386cd6498b9c63f8c6d10b3e08670b92c0f3f1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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