GHSA-Q6F4-QQRG-JV6X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 16:51 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:05
VLAI
Summary
@angular/common: Information Leak via Default Caching of Credentialed Requests in HttpTransferCache
Details

A vulnerability was discovered in @angular/common when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration are enabled. The HttpTransferCache utility optimizes hydration by caching outgoing HTTP requests performed during SSR and transferring the cached state to the client-side application via TransferState.

However, the caching mechanism fails to inspect the withCredentials flag or the Cookie header of outgoing requests. As a result, credentialed, user-specific responses may be cached by default in the shared TransferState payload. When these responses are serialized into the HTML, any caching layer (such as a CDN, reverse proxy, or shared server cache) that caches the SSR-rendered HTML page could inadvertently cache and leak one user's private data to other users, leading to a high-severity information disclosure vulnerability.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain sensitive, user-specific information of other authenticated users. This occurs when:

  • The SSR-rendered HTML containing the cached private data is stored in a shared cache (e.g., CDN, reverse proxy).
  • Subsequent requests for the same page receive the cached HTML containing the first user's private data.

Attack Preconditions

  • SSR and Hydration Enabled: The Angular application must be configured to use Server-Side Rendering and hydration (e.g., using provideClientHydration()).
  • Credentialed Requests during SSR: The application must perform HTTP requests that require user-specific authentication (using cookies or withCredentials: true) during the initial server-side render.
  • Shared Caching: The application's HTML responses must be cached by a shared caching layer (CDN, reverse proxy, or server-side cache) without proper cache-control headers to distinguish authenticated users.

Patches

  • 22.0.0-rc.2
  • 21.2.15
  • 20.3.22
  • 19.2.23
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "22.0.0-rc.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "19.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "19.2.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "18.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50170"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-524"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:51:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T18:16:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was discovered in `@angular/common` when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration are enabled. The `HttpTransferCache` utility optimizes hydration by caching outgoing HTTP requests performed during SSR and transferring the cached state to the client-side application via `TransferState`.\n\nHowever, the caching mechanism fails to inspect the `withCredentials` flag or the `Cookie` header of outgoing requests. As a result, credentialed, user-specific responses may be cached by default in the shared `TransferState` payload. When these responses are serialized into the HTML, any caching layer (such as a CDN, reverse proxy, or shared server cache) that caches the SSR-rendered HTML page could inadvertently cache and leak one user\u0027s private data to other users, leading to a high-severity information disclosure vulnerability.\n\n### Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain sensitive, user-specific information of other authenticated users. This occurs when:\n\n* The SSR-rendered HTML containing the cached private data is stored in a shared cache (e.g., CDN, reverse proxy).  \n* Subsequent requests for the same page receive the cached HTML containing the first user\u0027s private data.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n* **SSR and Hydration Enabled:** The Angular application must be configured to use Server-Side Rendering and hydration (e.g., using `provideClientHydration()`).  \n* **Credentialed Requests during SSR:** The application must perform HTTP requests that require user-specific authentication (using cookies or `withCredentials: true`) during the initial server-side render.  \n* **Shared Caching:** The application\u0027s HTML responses must be cached by a shared caching layer (CDN, reverse proxy, or server-side cache) without proper cache-control headers to distinguish authenticated users.\n\n### Patches\n- 22.0.0-rc.2\n- 21.2.15\n- 20.3.22\n- 19.2.23",
  "id": "GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T22:05:10Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T16:51:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/67964"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@angular/common: Information Leak via Default Caching of Credentialed Requests in HttpTransferCache"
}



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