{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:00:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\n`Webauthn\\Bundle\\Security\\Http\\Authenticator\\WebauthnAuthenticator` logs the full `Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\Request` object inside the log context of both `onAuthenticationSuccess()` and `onAuthenticationFailure()` at INFO level:\n\n```php\n$this-\u003elogger-\u003einfo(\u0027User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.\u0027, [\n    \u0027request\u0027 =\u003e $request,\n    \u0027firewallName\u0027 =\u003e $firewallName,\n    \u0027identifier\u0027 =\u003e $token-\u003egetUserIdentifier(),\n]);\n\n$this-\u003elogger-\u003einfo(\u0027Webauthn authentication request failed.\u0027, [\n    \u0027request\u0027 =\u003e $request,\n    \u0027exception\u0027 =\u003e $exception,\n]);\n```\n\n`Request::__toString()` returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for `LineFormatter`, `JsonFormatter` via `NormalizerFormatter`, etc.), sensitive headers such as `Cookie` (session identifier), `Authorization` and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.\n\nApplications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nEvery release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe fix removes the full `Request` object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil the upgrade is applied, projects can:\n\n1. Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.\n2. Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the `request` key from the context of these records before they are written.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of [Stepup-Webauthn](https://github.com/OpenConext/Stepup-Webauthn).",
  "id": "GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:00:49Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T21:00:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs"
}