GHSA-Q5QW-H33P-QVWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 19:48 – Updated: 2026-03-05 15:26Summary
When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.
The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.
Details
The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.
Example:
Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html
- Router sees:
/admin%2Fsecret.html→ does not match/admin/* - Static handler resolves:
/admin/secret.html
As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.
This only affects applications that both:
- Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
- Serve files from the same static root using
serveStatic.
This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.
Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.12.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29045"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-177"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T19:48:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T23:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen using `serveStatic` together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. `app.use(\u0027/admin/*\u0027, ...)`), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.\n\nThe router used `decodeURI`, while `serveStatic` used `decodeURIComponent`. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (`%2F`) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe routing layer preserved `%2F` as a literal string, while `serveStatic` decoded it into `/` before resolving the file path.\n\nExample:\n\nRequest: `/admin%2Fsecret.html`\n\n- Router sees: `/admin%2Fsecret.html` \u2192 does not match `/admin/*`\n- Static handler resolves: `/admin/secret.html`\n\nAs a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.\n\nThis only affects applications that both:\n\n- Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and\n- Serve files from the same static root using `serveStatic`.\n\nThis does **not** allow access outside the static root and is **not** a path traversal vulnerability.\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.\n\nApplications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.",
"id": "GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr",
"modified": "2026-03-05T15:26:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T19:48:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/6a0607a929d888893f0c91d92dce2fcfdb3662a3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hono vulnerable to arbitrary file access via serveStatic vulnerability "
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.