GHSA-Q4QW-J7HR-9445

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-23 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size

mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer

struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];

which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device:

packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
    goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
        (u8 *)touch);

packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.

A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64270"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size\n\nmms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a\nfixed-size on-stack buffer\n\n\tstruct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];\n\nwhich holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,\ni.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from\nthe device:\n\n\tpacket_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);\n\tif (packet_size \u003c= 0)\n\t\tgoto out;\n\t...\n\terror = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,\n\t\t\t(u8 *)touch);\n\npacket_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check\nis the lower bound packet_size \u003c= 0; it is never bounded against the\nsize of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller\n(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of\nup to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of\ntouch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can\noverwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.\n\nA well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject\nan oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler\u0027s\nother error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.",
  "id": "GHSA-q4qw-j7hr-9445",
  "modified": "2026-08-23T15:32:55Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/040843281eebfa110d08fd7fb083fe6cb55cea14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39b12daf1adb80f9595fdfe584961deb80860cbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d2ea15ba03bf17ed143ff1a0995a4206edc3fb6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8301c335305344d4da4ab9442b6a399dacfe5b8d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78150729762d47c14fe29a2582bdca5568e62b8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d99ba93c35ff2d5276e9c2632967481bd53a79d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3d5e77b27fded71dcb97f409262bf0abba0410e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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