GHSA-Q423-49RW-G9MH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:51 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:51Summary
GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ("Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked", fix in PR #36319 / commit 8a98ac22) added repo_model.ClearRepoWatches as a defense for the state transition public→private. The cleanup was wired into services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate only. The sister helper services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository — which is the function used by the API path PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo} — was not patched and still calls ClearRepoStars only.
As a result, when a public repository is flipped to private via the REST API (rather than via the web Settings → Danger Zone UI), the watch records persist. Affected users can:
- See the now-private repository in
GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions?private=truealong with its fullRepositoryJSON (description, default branch, language, fork status, counts, mirror metadata, license list, etc.) — even though they have no access to the repository. - Have their stale watch records re-leak content through any future notification path that does not include the send-time
CheckRepoUnitUsercheck that was added toservices/mailer/mail_release.go. - Inflate the visible
NumWatchescounter on the repository.
Severity
Medium — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Same impact class as the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp (which was classified Medium). The send-time mail filter added in the same PR mitigates the release-content disclosure vector. The residual leak is repo metadata via the subscriptions endpoint and stale watcher counts.
CWE-281 (Improper Preservation of Permissions), CWE-359 (Exposure of Private Personal Information), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information).
Affected Versions
Every release starting from v1.25.4 (the release shipping the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp fix) through HEAD (master @ ef801bb6, 2026-05-16). The follow-up refactor in commit 943ff752 (PR #36959, 2026-03-24) which merged MakeRepoPublic+MakeRepoPrivate did not propagate the ClearRepoWatches call to updateRepository.
Affected Component
services/repository/repository.go:240-302—func updateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged bool), the sister helper called via the API path. Clears stars on line 273 but never callsClearRepoWatches.routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit(line 573) →updateBasicProperties(line 678-697) →repo_service.UpdateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged)(line 726) — the API path that exercises the sister helper.
Steps to Reproduce
The bug is observable purely from static analysis; the live PoC is straightforward.
-
Start a Gitea instance at any release from v1.25.4 onwards (verified static at HEAD
ef801bb6). -
Create users
A(org admin) andB(member). Create a public repositoryA/proj. AsB, watch the repo:curl -u B:<token> -X PUT "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj/subscription" -
As
A, flip the repo to private via the REST API (not via the web UI):curl -u A:<token> -X PATCH "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"private": true}' -
As
B, listB's watched repos withprivate=true:curl -u B:<token> "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/user/subscriptions"
The now-private repo A/proj is returned in B's subscription list, with the full Repository payload — including description, default_branch, language, topics, license, fork/branch/issue/release counts, etc.
- Compare with the web-UI path (which IS patched). As
A, flip a different public repoA/proj2to private via Settings → Danger Zone → "Make this repository private" (which callsrepo_service.MakeRepoPrivate). VerifyB's subscription list no longer containsA/proj2.
The asymmetry of outcomes between steps 4 and 5 — for the same state transition — is the gap.
Direct Evidence (no PoC needed)
$ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository.go \
--jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n "ClearRepoWatches\|ClearRepoStars"
154: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {
157: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # MakeRepoPrivate
273: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # updateRepository — ClearRepoWatches missing here
The fix-author's own test file confirms the asymmetry:
$ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository_test.go --jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n "Test.*VisibilityChanged\|Test.*ClearsWatches"
44:func TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged(t *testing.T) { # only checks act.IsPrivate
73:func TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches(t *testing.T) { # checks watches are cleared
TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged explicitly calls updateRepository(ctx, repo, true) (line 53) and asserts act.IsPrivate (line 61) — but never verifies GetRepoWatchersIDs returns empty, while the parallel TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches does. The test asymmetry mirrors the fix asymmetry.
Impact
- An organization that uses terraform-gitea or any other REST-API-driven automation to flip repositories private (the canonical IaC pattern) hits
updateRepository, notMakeRepoPrivate. - An organization using the official Gitea SDK (
go-sdk,py-gitea, etc.) orcurlscripts to make repos private after an internal policy change hits the same path. - Multi-tenant Gitea-as-a-service operators with API-driven repository-lifecycle endpoints are exposed.
Stale watch rows leak through GET /user/subscriptions (with the watcher's own credentials), GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/subscribers (stale NumWatches total), and become a re-leak surface for any future notification path that forgets the send-time access check.
Suggested Fix
Drop-in mirror of the call already present in MakeRepoPrivate. In services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository, inside the existing if repo.IsPrivate { ... } branch (around line 265-276), add the ClearRepoWatches call directly after ClearRepoStars:
// services/repository/repository.go
func updateRepository(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, visibilityChanged bool) (err error) {
...
if visibilityChanged {
...
// If repo has become private, we need to set its actions to private.
if repo.IsPrivate {
_, err = e.Where("repo_id = ?", repo.ID).Cols("is_private").Update(&activities_model.Action{
IsPrivate: true,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {
return err
}
// Match MakeRepoPrivate's behavior — see PR #36319 / GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp.
// Stale watch rows on a now-private repo leak repository metadata to ex-watchers
// via GET /user/subscriptions?private=true and through any future notification
// path that does not have a send-time access check.
if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {
return err
}
}
...
}
...
}
Regression test (mirror of TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches) to add to services/repository/repository_test.go:
func TestUpdateRepositoryClearsWatchesOnVisibilityChange(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})
assert.False(t, repo.IsPrivate)
watchers, err := repo_model.GetRepoWatchersIDs(t.Context(), repo.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, watchers)
repo.IsPrivate = true
assert.NoError(t, updateRepository(t.Context(), repo, true))
watchers, err = repo_model.GetRepoWatchersIDs(t.Context(), repo.ID)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, watchers)
updatedRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: repo.ID})
assert.Zero(t, updatedRepo.NumWatches)
}
Optional belt-and-suspenders: an integration test against PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo} with body {"private": true} that exercises the entire API path through routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit.
Discovery Methodology
This finding follows the "sister-fix-incomplete" lens that has been productive across several recent reports: pick a recent advisory where the fix lands as a single PR touching one function, then grep the codebase for parallel call sites that should have received the same defense.
For Gitea:
- Enumerate recent advisories via
gh api graphql ... securityVulnerabilities(ecosystem: GO, package: code.gitea.io/gitea). - GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp stood out because the description names a state transition (public→private) — a class of bug where the defense is typically wired into a single helper.
gh api repos/.../commits/8a98ac221 --jq '.files[] | .filename'listed the fix files;ClearRepoWatcheswas added to one function.grep -rn "ClearRepoWatches\|MakeRepoPrivate"revealed two functions inservices/repository/repository.gothat handle the state transition:MakeRepoPrivate(patched) and the lowercase sisterupdateRepository(unpatched).- Walked the call chain from
routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Editto confirm the API path usesupdateRepository, notMakeRepoPrivate.
Pre-emptive rebuttals
- "The send-time filter in
MailNewReleasealready blocks release-content disclosure" — Correct, and acknowledged. The residual leak this report concerns is metadata via theGET /user/subscriptionsendpoint and staleNumWatches. The send-time filter is a necessary but not sufficient defense; theClearRepoWatchescall is the persistence-side belt-and-suspenders that the original PR author explicitly added. - "The web UI is the supported path; the API path is not in scope" — The API is documented public surface (swagger spec in
templates/swagger/v1_json.tmpl), Gitea ships official SDKs (go-sdk,py-gitea) that use exactly this path, and there is an official Terraform provider that exercises it. The existing fix is in a sister helper used by both paths' upstream helper — the fix author plainly intended to defend both. - "AccessMode is
Nonein the subscription response, so the client should infer no-access" — The response still returns the fullRepositorypayload including description, default branch, language, fork status, counts, mirror metadata, OriginalURL, license, etc. (seeservices/convert/repository.go::innerToRepoline 189-259).AccessMode: 0does not gate the metadata fields, only thePermissions{Admin,Push,Pull}triple.
References
- GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp — the original advisory: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp
- PR #36319 "clean watches when make a repository private and check permission when send release emails" (commit
8a98ac221) - PR #36959 "Require additional user confirmation for making repo private" (commit
943ff7523) — the later refactor that did not propagate the cleanup - Patched function:
services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate(line 125, callsClearRepoWatchesline 157) - Unpatched sister:
services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository(line 240, calls onlyClearRepoStarsline 273) - API entry:
routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit→updateBasicProperties→repo_service.UpdateRepository→updateRepository - Test asymmetry:
services/repository/repository_test.go::TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches(covered) vsTestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged(does not assert watches cleared)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-281",
"CWE-359"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:51:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp (\"Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked\", fix in PR #36319 / commit 8a98ac22) added `repo_model.ClearRepoWatches` as a defense for the state transition public\u2192private. The cleanup was wired into `services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate` only. The sister helper `services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository` \u2014 which is the function used by the API path `PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}` \u2014 was not patched and still calls `ClearRepoStars` only.\n\nAs a result, when a public repository is flipped to private via the REST API (rather than via the web Settings \u2192 Danger Zone UI), the watch records persist. Affected users can:\n\n- See the now-private repository in `GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions?private=true` along with its full `Repository` JSON (description, default branch, language, fork status, counts, mirror metadata, license list, etc.) \u2014 even though they have no access to the repository.\n- Have their stale watch records re-leak content through any future notification path that does not include the send-time `CheckRepoUnitUser` check that was added to `services/mailer/mail_release.go`.\n- Inflate the visible `NumWatches` counter on the repository.\n\n## Severity\n\nMedium \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n\nSame impact class as the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp (which was classified Medium). The send-time mail filter added in the same PR mitigates the release-content disclosure vector. The residual leak is repo metadata via the subscriptions endpoint and stale watcher counts.\n\nCWE-281 (Improper Preservation of Permissions), CWE-359 (Exposure of Private Personal Information), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information).\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nEvery release starting from v1.25.4 (the release shipping the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp fix) through HEAD (master @ `ef801bb6`, 2026-05-16). The follow-up refactor in commit `943ff752` (PR #36959, 2026-03-24) which merged `MakeRepoPublic`+`MakeRepoPrivate` did not propagate the `ClearRepoWatches` call to `updateRepository`.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `services/repository/repository.go:240-302` \u2014 `func updateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged bool)`, the sister helper called via the API path. Clears stars on line 273 but never calls `ClearRepoWatches`.\n- `routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit` (line 573) \u2192 `updateBasicProperties` (line 678-697) \u2192 `repo_service.UpdateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged)` (line 726) \u2014 the API path that exercises the sister helper.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nThe bug is observable purely from static analysis; the live PoC is straightforward.\n\n1. Start a Gitea instance at any release from v1.25.4 onwards (verified static at HEAD `ef801bb6`).\n\n2. Create users `A` (org admin) and `B` (member). Create a public repository `A/proj`. As `B`, watch the repo:\n ```\n curl -u B:\u003ctoken\u003e -X PUT \"https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj/subscription\"\n ```\n\n3. As `A`, flip the repo to private via the REST API (not via the web UI):\n ```\n curl -u A:\u003ctoken\u003e -X PATCH \"https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"private\": true}\u0027\n ```\n\n4. As `B`, list `B`\u0027s watched repos with `private=true`:\n ```\n curl -u B:\u003ctoken\u003e \"https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/user/subscriptions\"\n ```\n\n The now-private repo `A/proj` is returned in `B`\u0027s subscription list, with the full `Repository` payload \u2014 including `description`, `default_branch`, `language`, `topics`, `license`, fork/branch/issue/release counts, etc.\n\n5. Compare with the web-UI path (which IS patched). As `A`, flip a different public repo `A/proj2` to private via Settings \u2192 Danger Zone \u2192 \"Make this repository private\" (which calls `repo_service.MakeRepoPrivate`). Verify `B`\u0027s subscription list no longer contains `A/proj2`.\n\nThe asymmetry of outcomes between steps 4 and 5 \u2014 for the same state transition \u2014 is the gap.\n\n## Direct Evidence (no PoC needed)\n\n```\n$ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository.go \\\n --jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n \"ClearRepoWatches\\|ClearRepoStars\" \n\n154: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {\n157: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # MakeRepoPrivate\n273: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # updateRepository \u2014 ClearRepoWatches missing here\n```\n\nThe fix-author\u0027s own test file confirms the asymmetry:\n\n```\n$ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository_test.go --jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n \"Test.*VisibilityChanged\\|Test.*ClearsWatches\"\n\n44:func TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged(t *testing.T) { # only checks act.IsPrivate\n73:func TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches(t *testing.T) { # checks watches are cleared\n```\n\n`TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged` explicitly calls `updateRepository(ctx, repo, true)` (line 53) and asserts `act.IsPrivate` (line 61) \u2014 but never verifies `GetRepoWatchersIDs` returns empty, while the parallel `TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches` does. The test asymmetry mirrors the fix asymmetry.\n\n## Impact\n\n- An organization that uses [terraform-gitea](https://github.com/go-gitea/terraform-provider-gitea) or any other REST-API-driven automation to flip repositories private (the canonical IaC pattern) hits `updateRepository`, not `MakeRepoPrivate`.\n- An organization using the official Gitea SDK (`go-sdk`, `py-gitea`, etc.) or `curl` scripts to make repos private after an internal policy change hits the same path.\n- Multi-tenant Gitea-as-a-service operators with API-driven repository-lifecycle endpoints are exposed.\n\nStale watch rows leak through `GET /user/subscriptions` (with the watcher\u0027s own credentials), `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/subscribers` (stale `NumWatches` total), and become a re-leak surface for any future notification path that forgets the send-time access check.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDrop-in mirror of the call already present in `MakeRepoPrivate`. In `services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository`, inside the existing `if repo.IsPrivate { ... }` branch (around line 265-276), add the `ClearRepoWatches` call directly after `ClearRepoStars`:\n\n```go\n// services/repository/repository.go\nfunc updateRepository(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, visibilityChanged bool) (err error) {\n ...\n if visibilityChanged {\n ...\n // If repo has become private, we need to set its actions to private.\n if repo.IsPrivate {\n _, err = e.Where(\"repo_id = ?\", repo.ID).Cols(\"is_private\").Update(\u0026activities_model.Action{\n IsPrivate: true,\n })\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n // Match MakeRepoPrivate\u0027s behavior \u2014 see PR #36319 / GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp.\n // Stale watch rows on a now-private repo leak repository metadata to ex-watchers\n // via GET /user/subscriptions?private=true and through any future notification\n // path that does not have a send-time access check.\n if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil {\n return err\n }\n }\n ...\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\nRegression test (mirror of `TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches`) to add to `services/repository/repository_test.go`:\n\n```go\nfunc TestUpdateRepositoryClearsWatchesOnVisibilityChange(t *testing.T) {\n assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())\n\n repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, \u0026repo_model.Repository{ID: 1})\n assert.False(t, repo.IsPrivate)\n\n watchers, err := repo_model.GetRepoWatchersIDs(t.Context(), repo.ID)\n require.NoError(t, err)\n require.NotEmpty(t, watchers)\n\n repo.IsPrivate = true\n assert.NoError(t, updateRepository(t.Context(), repo, true))\n\n watchers, err = repo_model.GetRepoWatchersIDs(t.Context(), repo.ID)\n assert.NoError(t, err)\n assert.Empty(t, watchers)\n\n updatedRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, \u0026repo_model.Repository{ID: repo.ID})\n assert.Zero(t, updatedRepo.NumWatches)\n}\n```\n\nOptional belt-and-suspenders: an integration test against `PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}` with body `{\"private\": true}` that exercises the entire API path through `routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit`.\n\n## Discovery Methodology\n\nThis finding follows the \"sister-fix-incomplete\" lens that has been productive across several recent reports: pick a recent advisory where the fix lands as a single PR touching one function, then grep the codebase for parallel call sites that should have received the same defense.\n\nFor Gitea:\n\n1. Enumerate recent advisories via `gh api graphql ... securityVulnerabilities(ecosystem: GO, package: code.gitea.io/gitea)`.\n2. GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp stood out because the description names a state transition (public\u2192private) \u2014 a class of bug where the defense is typically wired into a single helper.\n3. `gh api repos/.../commits/8a98ac221 --jq \u0027.files[] | .filename\u0027` listed the fix files; `ClearRepoWatches` was added to one function.\n4. `grep -rn \"ClearRepoWatches\\|MakeRepoPrivate\"` revealed two functions in `services/repository/repository.go` that handle the state transition: `MakeRepoPrivate` (patched) and the lowercase sister `updateRepository` (unpatched).\n5. Walked the call chain from `routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit` to confirm the API path uses `updateRepository`, not `MakeRepoPrivate`.\n\n## Pre-emptive rebuttals\n\n- \"The send-time filter in `MailNewRelease` already blocks release-content disclosure\" \u2014 Correct, and acknowledged. The residual leak this report concerns is metadata via the `GET /user/subscriptions` endpoint and stale `NumWatches`. The send-time filter is a necessary but not sufficient defense; the `ClearRepoWatches` call is the persistence-side belt-and-suspenders that the original PR author explicitly added.\n- \"The web UI is the supported path; the API path is not in scope\" \u2014 The API is documented public surface (swagger spec in `templates/swagger/v1_json.tmpl`), Gitea ships official SDKs (`go-sdk`, `py-gitea`) that use exactly this path, and there is an official Terraform provider that exercises it. The existing fix is in a sister helper used by both paths\u0027 upstream helper \u2014 the fix author plainly intended to defend both.\n- \"AccessMode is `None` in the subscription response, so the client should infer no-access\" \u2014 The response still returns the full `Repository` payload including description, default branch, language, fork status, counts, mirror metadata, OriginalURL, license, etc. (see `services/convert/repository.go::innerToRepo` line 189-259). `AccessMode: 0` does not gate the metadata fields, only the `Permissions{Admin,Push,Pull}` triple.\n\n## References\n\n- GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp \u2014 the original advisory: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp\n- PR #36319 \"clean watches when make a repository private and check permission when send release emails\" (commit `8a98ac221`)\n- PR #36959 \"Require additional user confirmation for making repo private\" (commit `943ff7523`) \u2014 the later refactor that did not propagate the cleanup\n- Patched function: `services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate` (line 125, calls `ClearRepoWatches` line 157)\n- Unpatched sister: `services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository` (line 240, calls only `ClearRepoStars` line 273)\n- API entry: `routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit` \u2192 `updateBasicProperties` \u2192 `repo_service.UpdateRepository` \u2192 `updateRepository`\n- Test asymmetry: `services/repository/repository_test.go::TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches` (covered) vs `TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged` (does not assert watches cleared)",
"id": "GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:51:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:51:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path \u2014 sister code path retains stale watches on public-\u003eprivate"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.