GHSA-Q3W6-Q3HC-C5X6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 22:51 – Updated: 2026-05-27 22:51Summary
The GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled.
Details
File: server/api/projects/index.js
prjApp.get("/api/project", secureFnc, function(req, res) {
const permission = checkGroupsFnc(req);
runtime.project.getProject(req.userId, permission).then(result => {
if (result) {
res.json(result);
}
});
});
The endpoint uses the secureFnc middleware, but this middleware calls verifyToken in server/api/jwt-helper.js which auto-generates a valid guest JWT when no token is provided (line 49-51):
if (!token) {
token = getGuestToken();
}
The guest token is signed with the server's secret and passes verification. The handler then calls getProject which returns the full project data. The _filterProjectPermission function (line 924 of server/runtime/project/index.js) filters some UI elements for non-admin users, but it does not remove scripts, devices, alarms, or other sensitive configuration data.
PoC
Environment
- FUXA v1.3.0-2773 (
frangoteam/fuxa:latest) secureEnabled: truewith a randomsecretCode
Retrieve full project data without authentication:
curl -s http://192.168.32.129:1881/api/project
{
"scripts": [
{
"id": "SCRIPT_ID",
"name": "calculate"
},
]
}
No authentication token, API key, or cookie was provided. The response includes:
- Server-side scripts: full source code, IDs, names, execution mode, and permission levels. This reveals internal automation logic and sensitive project structure information that could assist further attacks against the deployed system.
- Device configurations: and communication endpoint information may also be exposed depending on the deployed project configuration.
- HMI views: the full SVG content and layout of every operator screen, including variable bindings that map UI elements to device tags.
- Alarm definitions: alarm thresholds, conditions, and notification settings when configured.
Impact
The endpoint may expose sensitive project configuration data including script metadata, device connection information, HMI configuration, and alarm definitions. In industrial environments this information can assist further targeted attacks against the deployed system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fuxa-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47717"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T22:51:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled.\n\n### Details\n\nFile: `server/api/projects/index.js`\n\n```javascript\nprjApp.get(\"/api/project\", secureFnc, function(req, res) {\n const permission = checkGroupsFnc(req);\n runtime.project.getProject(req.userId, permission).then(result =\u003e {\n if (result) {\n res.json(result);\n }\n });\n});\n```\n\nThe endpoint uses the `secureFnc` middleware, but this middleware calls `verifyToken` in `server/api/jwt-helper.js` which auto-generates a valid guest JWT when no token is provided (line 49-51):\n\n```javascript\nif (!token) {\n token = getGuestToken();\n}\n```\n\nThe guest token is signed with the server\u0027s secret and passes verification. The handler then calls `getProject` which returns the full project data. The `_filterProjectPermission` function (line 924 of `server/runtime/project/index.js`) filters some UI elements for non-admin users, but it does not remove scripts, devices, alarms, or other sensitive configuration data.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment**\n\n- FUXA v1.3.0-2773 (`frangoteam/fuxa:latest`)\n- `secureEnabled: true` with a random `secretCode`\n\n**Retrieve full project data without authentication:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://192.168.32.129:1881/api/project\n```\n\n```json\n{\n \"scripts\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"SCRIPT_ID\",\n \"name\": \"calculate\"\n },\n ]\n}\n```\n\nNo authentication token, API key, or cookie was provided. The response includes:\n\n- **Server-side scripts**: full source code, IDs, names, execution mode, and permission levels. This reveals internal automation logic and sensitive project structure information that could assist further attacks against the deployed system.\n- **Device configurations**: and communication endpoint information may also be exposed depending on the deployed project configuration.\n- **HMI views**: the full SVG content and layout of every operator screen, including variable bindings that map UI elements to device tags.\n- **Alarm definitions**: alarm thresholds, conditions, and notification settings when configured.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe endpoint may expose sensitive project configuration data including script metadata, device connection information, HMI configuration, and alarm definitions. In industrial environments this information can assist further targeted attacks against the deployed system.",
"id": "GHSA-q3w6-q3hc-c5x6",
"modified": "2026-05-27T22:51:18Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T22:51:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-q3w6-q3hc-c5x6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FUXA\u0027s Unauthenticated Project Data Disclosure Exposes Server-Side Scripts and Device Configurations"
}
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