GHSA-Q3VH-MMHJ-MXHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: io: Reject non-user protection in ioremap_prot()
Mapping a stack-top page via /dev/mem with PROT_NONE and then reading that process's /proc//cmdline triggers a spurious WARN in ioremap_prot() through generic_access_phys():
WARNING: ./arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h:275 at generic_access_phys Call trace: generic_access_phys+0x1c8/0x228 (P) __access_remote_vm+0x2b4/0x398 access_remote_vm+0x14/0x30 get_mm_cmdline+0xf8/0x2a0 proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x68/0x120
generic_access_phys() passes the protection derived from the user PTE to ioremap_prot(). On arm64, a PROT_NONE mapping is represented by a present-invalid PTE, so pte_present() still returns true and the protection reaches ioremap_prot().
A PROT_NONE mapping does not have PTE_USER, causing the existing WARN_ON_ONCE() in ioremap_prot() to fire even though this is a valid user mapping. Execute-only mappings have the same issue and must not be readable through this path either.
ioremap_prot() should therefore reject protection values without PTE_USER without warning. This makes the access fail cleanly for PROT_NONE and execute-only mappings while retaining the existing user-protection contract.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: io: Reject non-user protection in ioremap_prot()\n\nMapping a stack-top page via /dev/mem with PROT_NONE and then\nreading that process\u0027s /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline triggers a spurious WARN\nin ioremap_prot() through generic_access_phys():\n\n WARNING: ./arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h:275 at generic_access_phys\n Call trace:\n generic_access_phys+0x1c8/0x228 (P)\n __access_remote_vm+0x2b4/0x398\n access_remote_vm+0x14/0x30\n get_mm_cmdline+0xf8/0x2a0\n proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x68/0x120\n\ngeneric_access_phys() passes the protection derived from the user PTE\nto ioremap_prot(). On arm64, a PROT_NONE mapping is represented by a\npresent-invalid PTE, so pte_present() still returns true and the\nprotection reaches ioremap_prot().\n\nA PROT_NONE mapping does not have PTE_USER, causing the existing\nWARN_ON_ONCE() in ioremap_prot() to fire even though this is a valid\nuser mapping. Execute-only mappings have the same issue and must not\nbe readable through this path either.\n\nioremap_prot() should therefore reject protection values without\nPTE_USER without warning. This makes the access fail cleanly for\nPROT_NONE and execute-only mappings while retaining the existing\nuser-protection contract.",
"id": "GHSA-q3vh-mmhj-mxhr",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b04af3d88bb7fc69b2d92457890608860e42365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b583795feb51f8d50203228d001760d1344ef01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b17aa4955e3a694c663ebe99626e4c76ca4f7cfb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb756b11ad63832ebee58caf9e8f9381eaecff9f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fddc90d4af4550af410f52d11bbf6b5f36443838"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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