GHSA-Q2QW-GHP2-FCQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSD: Fix out-of-bounds read in the rpc_status dump

nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit() loads args->opcnt and args->ops separately, then walks ops[] before rechecking rq_status_counter. A COMPOUND that completes between the two loads runs nfsd4_release_compoundargs(), which zeroes opcnt and points ops back at the eight-entry inline array. A dump that already sampled an opcnt of 200 clamps it to the sixteen slots in rq_opnum, then indexes iops[0..15]. iops is the last member of struct nfsd4_compoundargs and rq_argp is allocated at exactly that size, so the walk runs off the end of the allocation. The trailing recheck discards the sampled data, but the read has already happened. NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET carries no GENL_ADMIN_PERM, so an unprivileged local user can repeat the dump against a busy server until it lands in the window.

Sample opcnt and ops into locals, then finish the counter recheck before dereferencing ops. An unchanged counter means both came from the same COMPOUND, where opcnt cannot exceed what ops holds.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99364"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:48Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: Fix out-of-bounds read in the rpc_status dump\n\nnfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit() loads args-\u003eopcnt and\nargs-\u003eops separately, then walks ops[] before rechecking\nrq_status_counter. A COMPOUND that completes between the two loads\nruns nfsd4_release_compoundargs(), which zeroes opcnt and points ops\nback at the eight-entry inline array. A dump that already sampled an\nopcnt of 200 clamps it to the sixteen slots in rq_opnum, then indexes\niops[0..15]. iops is the last member of struct nfsd4_compoundargs and\nrq_argp is allocated at exactly that size, so the walk runs off the\nend of the allocation. The trailing recheck discards the sampled data,\nbut the read has already happened. NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET carries\nno GENL_ADMIN_PERM, so an unprivileged local user can repeat the dump\nagainst a busy server until it lands in the window.\n\nSample opcnt and ops into locals, then finish the counter recheck\nbefore dereferencing ops. An unchanged counter means both came from the\nsame COMPOUND, where opcnt cannot exceed what ops holds.",
  "id": "GHSA-q2qw-ghp2-fcq6",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35c0d6b9d14c1f065dfa8338063fbe3b396b4b3c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6239443bacb4cb1bb4a9e868474ccc03b2f709ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/676b048197cd4b83d63690fc7452a3af9bfd0c43"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbea14890783fead76f878caf0775a62a42049bf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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