GHSA-Q28V-664F-Q6WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-14 19:24 – Updated: 2025-07-22 18:33Impact
An endpoint used to display details of users listed in certain fields (such as ACLs) could be misused to dump basic user details (such as name, affiliation and email) in bulk.
[!TIP] If your instance allows everyone to create a user account, and you wish to truly restrict access to these user details, consider restricting user search to managers. You can find details on the newly introduced indico.conf setting
ALLOW_PUBLIC_USER_SEARCHin our documentation.
Patches
You should to update to Indico 3.3.7 as soon as possible. See the docs for instructions on how to update.
Workarounds
It is possible to restrict access to the affected endpoints (e.g. in the webserver config), but doing so would break certain form fields which could no longer show the details of the users listed in those fields, so upgrading instead is highly recommended.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open a thread in our forum
- Email us privately at indico-team@cern.ch
Credits
This vulnerability was identified during a security assessment conducted as part of the Red Team Residency Program at RNP (Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa). The research and testing were performed by a security researcher working under RNP’s authorization and coordination. Special acknowledgment goes to the RNP Security Team, which provided the infrastructure, methodology, and ethical oversight for this work.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "indico"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53640"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-14T19:24:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-14T21:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn endpoint used to display details of users listed in certain fields (such as ACLs) could be misused to dump basic user details (such as name, affiliation and email) in bulk.\n\n\u003e [!TIP]\n\u003e If your instance allows everyone to create a user account, and you wish to truly restrict access to these user details, consider restricting user search to managers. You can find details on the newly introduced indico.conf setting [`ALLOW_PUBLIC_USER_SEARCH`](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/config/settings/#ALLOW_PUBLIC_USER_SEARCH) in our documentation.\n\n### Patches\nYou should to update to [Indico 3.3.7](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.7) as soon as possible.\nSee [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is possible to restrict access to the affected endpoints (e.g. in the webserver config), but doing so would break certain form fields which could no longer show the details of the users listed in those fields, so upgrading instead is highly recommended.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open a thread in [our forum](https://talk.getindico.io/)\n- Email us privately at [indico-team@cern.ch](mailto:indico-team@cern.ch)\n\n#### Credits\nThis vulnerability was identified during a security assessment conducted as part of the Red Team Residency Program at RNP (Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa).\nThe research and testing were performed by a security researcher working under RNP\u2019s authorization and coordination.\nSpecial acknowledgment goes to the RNP Security Team, which provided the infrastructure, methodology, and ethical oversight for this work.",
"id": "GHSA-q28v-664f-q6wj",
"modified": "2025-07-22T18:33:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-14T19:24:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico/security/advisories/GHSA-q28v-664f-q6wj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico/pull/6936/commits/f8583557a3da56aeea8857ae69bf17c9066c95c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/config/settings/#ALLOW_PUBLIC_USER_SEARCH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve202553640-detect-indico-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve202553640-mitigate-indico-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Indico vulnerability allows attackers to bulk dump user details"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.