GHSA-PX9J-VXFF-4464
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate SMB1 EA list bounds before parsing
CIFSSMBQAllEAs() checks the server-provided EA list length by adding it to the response pointer. On 32-bit systems, a positive length can wrap the pointer and pass the comparison. The parser then walks outside the received response while reading the next FEA header.
A response with a list length of 0x40000000 reproduces this as a native i386 page fault and kernel panic from listxattr() against an SMB1 server.
Check that the EA list starts within the SMB byte area before reading its header. Keep its length unsigned and compare it with the bytes left in the response without pointer addition.
SMB1 is not negotiated by default and requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99379"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:49Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: validate SMB1 EA list bounds before parsing\n\nCIFSSMBQAllEAs() checks the server-provided EA list length by adding it\nto the response pointer. On 32-bit systems, a positive length can wrap\nthe pointer and pass the comparison. The parser then walks outside the\nreceived response while reading the next FEA header.\n\nA response with a list length of 0x40000000 reproduces this as a native\ni386 page fault and kernel panic from listxattr() against an SMB1\nserver.\n\nCheck that the EA list starts within the SMB byte area before reading\nits header. Keep its length unsigned and compare it with the bytes left\nin the response without pointer addition.\n\nSMB1 is not negotiated by default and requires an explicit vers=1.0\nmount.",
"id": "GHSA-px9j-vxff-4464",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25b2cf78709cffcc04b2c576e7150d46b0cecef0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8eec99e61b79bb5f698754dda8e8a1ff7e4ed7ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccdd05f4573951164edd0390bb995fe6d2072441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddc7a7e1eeb116ccaf010a6f1fb6ab927f3f888d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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