Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-PWX6-FVF4-6686

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update

unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)) before it assigns a peer (unix_peer(sk) = newsk). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.

     CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect
     --------                            ------------

                            WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)

sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Initial idea was to move peer assignment before the sk_state update1, but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered2, but the follow-up discussion3 focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()4. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex5. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock6. This way we circled back to the peer check idea2.

Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update:

connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()

Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.

connect() vs BPF program doing update

Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to

  BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP

Plus one more race to consider:

        CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect
        --------                            ------------

                               WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)

sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic()

---truncated---

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53034"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:14Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\n\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state,\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\nthere\u0027s a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\n\n         CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n         --------                            ------------\n\n                                WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n...\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\n                                sock_hold(newsk)\n                                smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                                unix_peer(sk) = newsk\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\nCall Trace:\n  sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\n  sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\n  sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\n  __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\n  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\n  do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\nwas rejected.\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\nunix_state_lock()[4].\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\nspin_lock(\u0026unix_sk(s)-\u003elock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\n\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\nupdate:\n\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\n\n   Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won\u0027t\n   be released until socket fd is released. And that\u0027s not an issue because\n   sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\n\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\n\n   Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\n\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\n\n   Plus one more race to consider:\n\n            CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n            --------                            ------------\n\n                                   WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\n   sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n                                   sock_hold(newsk)\n                                   smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                \n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-pwx6-fvf4-6686",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53034"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2026-53034 (GCVE-0-2026-53034)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-24 16:29 – Updated: 2026-06-24 16:29

Title

bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL. CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Initial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1], but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()[4]. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex[5]. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6]. This way we circled back to the peer check idea[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/ Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update: 1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys() Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf. 2. connect() vs BPF program doing update Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only) BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP Plus one more race to consider: CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() ---truncated---

Severity

No CVSS data available.

Assigner

Linux

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59e…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e1…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d0…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00a…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4 (git) Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10 (git) Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317 (git) Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0 (git) Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0 (git) Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 5.15 Unaffected: 0 , < 5.15 (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.175 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.141 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.91 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.33 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.0.10 , ≤ 7.0.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/unix/unix_bpf.c"
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        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\n\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state,\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\nthere\u0027s a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\n\n         CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n         --------                            ------------\n\n                                WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n...\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\n                                sock_hold(newsk)\n                                smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                                unix_peer(sk) = newsk\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\nCall Trace:\n  sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\n  sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\n  sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\n  __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\n  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\n  do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\nwas rejected.\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\nunix_state_lock()[4].\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\nspin_lock(\u0026unix_sk(s)-\u003elock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\n\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\nupdate:\n\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\n\n   Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won\u0027t\n   be released until socket fd is released. And that\u0027s not an issue because\n   sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\n\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\n\n   Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\n\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\n\n   Plus one more race to consider:\n\n            CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n            --------                            ------------\n\n                                   WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\n   sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n                                   sock_hold(newsk)\n                                   smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                \n---truncated---"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a"
        }
      ],
      "title": "bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-53034",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-09T07:44:35.380Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-PWX6-FVF4-6686

CVE-2026-53034 (GCVE-0-2026-53034)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature