GHSA-PWX6-FVF4-6686
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-15 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update
unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state,
TCP_ESTABLISHED)) before it assigns a peer (unix_peer(sk) = newsk).
sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that
socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,
there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on
socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.
CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect
-------- ------------
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)
sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Initial idea was to move peer assignment before the sk_state update1, but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered2, but the follow-up discussion3 focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()4. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex5. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock6. This way we circled back to the peer check idea2.
Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update:
- connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()
Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.
- connect() vs BPF program doing update
Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to
BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT
BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT
BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP
Plus one more race to consider:
CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect
-------- ------------
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)
sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic()
---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\n\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state,\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\nthere\u0027s a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\n\n CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect\n -------- ------------\n\n WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n...\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\n sock_hold(newsk)\n smp_mb__after_atomic()\n unix_peer(sk) = newsk\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\nCall Trace:\n sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\n sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\n sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\n __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\n __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\n do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\nwas rejected.\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\nunix_state_lock()[4].\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\nspin_lock(\u0026unix_sk(s)-\u003elock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\n\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\nupdate:\n\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\n\n Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won\u0027t\n be released until socket fd is released. And that\u0027s not an issue because\n sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\n\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\n\n Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\n\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\n BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\n\n Plus one more race to consider:\n\n CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect\n -------- ------------\n\n WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\n sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n sock_hold(newsk)\n smp_mb__after_atomic()\n \n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-pwx6-fvf4-6686",
"modified": "2026-07-15T15:32:45Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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