GHSA-PW9P-V7R6-GX4P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 22:43 – Updated: 2026-10-28 22:43
VLAI
Summary
Tornado: Open redirect in RedirectHandler via protocol-relative URLs
Details

Summary

tornado.web.RedirectHandler builds its target URL by substituting parts of the request path into a template. Depending on where those substitutions appear in the template, an attacker can craft a request that redirects to a host of their choosing. This creates an open redirect on the application's domain, which can be used in phishing.

Impact

Applications are affected if they use RedirectHandler with a URL template where a regex capture group can influence the scheme or host of the redirect. This includes:

  • A substitution at the start of the path, for example (r"/(.*)/target", RedirectHandler, {"url": "/{0}/destination"}). A request to https://example.com//evil.com/target redirects to //evil.com/destination, a protocol-relative URL pointing to evil.com. Variants using backslashes or encoded characters have the same effect, because browsers treat them as equivalent to //.
  • A substitution directly after the host, for example (r"/old(.*)", RedirectHandler, {"url": "https://new.example.com{0}"}). A request to /old.evil.com/ or /old@evil.com/ redirects to evil.com.
  • A template that begins with a substitution (such as "{0}"), which can be given an absolute URL.

Applications are not affected if their RedirectHandler templates use only static URLs, or if every substitution comes after a fixed host and a / (for example "/static/{0}" or "https://example.com/{0}"). Other uses of RequestHandler.redirect() are not affected by this advisory, although applications that pass user-controlled input to redirect() should validate it themselves.

Patches

Fixed in Tornado 6.6. RedirectHandler now returns a 400 error if the substituted values would change the scheme or host of the redirect from what the template specifies. As a result, substitutions can no longer be used in the scheme or host part of a template. The similar check in StaticFileHandler has also been hardened against backslash and whitespace variants.

Workarounds

  • Change RedirectHandler templates so every substitution comes after a fixed prefix ending in /, or write capture-group regexes that cannot match characters such as /, \, @, . or : where they could affect the host.
  • Alternatively, replace RedirectHandler with a custom handler that validates the target before calling self.redirect().

Credit

Reported by Longwei Wang (@gn00295120).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tornado"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-116578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T22:43:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T21:18:14Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`tornado.web.RedirectHandler` builds its target URL by substituting parts of the request path into a template. Depending on where those substitutions appear in the template, an attacker can craft a request that redirects to a host of their choosing. This creates an open redirect on the application\u0027s domain, which can be used in phishing.\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications are affected if they use `RedirectHandler` with a URL template where a regex capture group can influence the scheme or host of the redirect. This includes:\n\n- **A substitution at the start of the path**, for example `(r\"/(.*)/target\", RedirectHandler, {\"url\": \"/{0}/destination\"})`. A request to `https://example.com//evil.com/target` redirects to `//evil.com/destination`, a protocol-relative URL pointing to evil.com. Variants using backslashes or encoded characters have the same effect, because browsers treat them as equivalent to `//`.\n- **A substitution directly after the host**, for example `(r\"/old(.*)\", RedirectHandler, {\"url\": \"https://new.example.com{0}\"})`. A request to `/old.evil.com/` or `/old@evil.com/` redirects to evil.com.\n- **A template that begins with a substitution** (such as `\"{0}\"`), which can be given an absolute URL.\n\nApplications are not affected if their `RedirectHandler` templates use only static URLs, or if every substitution comes after a fixed host and a `/` (for example `\"/static/{0}\"` or `\"https://example.com/{0}\"`). Other uses of `RequestHandler.redirect()` are not affected by this advisory, although applications that pass user-controlled input to `redirect()` should validate it themselves.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Tornado 6.6. `RedirectHandler` now returns a 400 error if the substituted values would change the scheme or host of the redirect from what the template specifies. As a result, substitutions can no longer be used in the scheme or host part of a template. The similar check in `StaticFileHandler` has also been hardened against backslash and whitespace variants.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Change `RedirectHandler` templates so every substitution comes after a fixed prefix ending in `/`, or write capture-group regexes that cannot match characters such as `/`, `\\`, `@`, `.` or `:` where they could affect the host.\n- Alternatively, replace `RedirectHandler` with a custom handler that validates the target before calling `self.redirect()`.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Longwei Wang (@gn00295120).",
  "id": "GHSA-pw9p-v7r6-gx4p",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T22:43:45Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T22:43:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-pw9p-v7r6-gx4p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/pull/3786"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/940ea725bdd9bc68231d68a105eef17ea6e11233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/cc75ab0eb3af459c714895a49f682ad354f50117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/ccb6a2e5482f17997efd4a74b8200d5b4babc035"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/releases/tag/v6.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tornado: Open redirect in RedirectHandler via protocol-relative URLs"
}



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