GHSA-PW6H-RJH8-7GRW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-10 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-10 06:30The Advanced IP Blocker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 8.13.13 The vulnerability exists because handle_login_action() performs no server-side check — via transient, session marker, or equivalent — that a requester completed step-1 password authentication before processing a step-2 TOTP submission for the POSTed user_id; compounding this, an error branch in the function unconditionally mints a fresh advaipbl-2fa-interim-{user_id} nonce and delivers it in a Location header to any unauthenticated caller, after which display_2fa_login_form_step_2() renders a valid advaipbl-2fa-verify-{user_id} nonce in HTML — both nonces computed against a fixed uid=0 empty-session context and therefore fully reusable by the attacker across subsequent requests. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication entirely for any 2FA-enabled account, including administrators, by brute-forcing an unthrottled 6-digit TOTP code (no attempt counter, no account lockout, and no wp_login_failed firing) and receiving a fully authenticated session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie without ever supplying the account password, resulting in complete site takeover. Exploitation requires only a known user_id for an account that has the plugin's 2FA feature enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104732"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-10T04:18:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Advanced IP Blocker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 8.13.13 The vulnerability exists because `handle_login_action()` performs no server-side check \u2014 via transient, session marker, or equivalent \u2014 that a requester completed step-1 password authentication before processing a step-2 TOTP submission for the POSTed `user_id`; compounding this, an error branch in the function unconditionally mints a fresh `advaipbl-2fa-interim-{user_id}` nonce and delivers it in a `Location` header to any unauthenticated caller, after which `display_2fa_login_form_step_2()` renders a valid `advaipbl-2fa-verify-{user_id}` nonce in HTML \u2014 both nonces computed against a fixed `uid=0` empty-session context and therefore fully reusable by the attacker across subsequent requests. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication entirely for any 2FA-enabled account, including administrators, by brute-forcing an unthrottled 6-digit TOTP code (no attempt counter, no account lockout, and no `wp_login_failed` firing) and receiving a fully authenticated session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie` without ever supplying the account password, resulting in complete site takeover. Exploitation requires only a known `user_id` for an account that has the plugin\u0027s 2FA feature enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-pw6h-rjh8-7grw",
"modified": "2026-10-10T06:30:56Z",
"published": "2026-10-10T06:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104732"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-2fa-manager.php#L71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L6875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L6912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-ip-blocker/tags/8.13.13/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php#L7022"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3725139/advanced-ip-blocker/trunk/includes/class-advaipbl-main.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d080845b-6814-4b10-a3ab-1f5aa1d09132?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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