GHSA-PW2H-9H4H-HF7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: restore refcount ordering for lockless socket access
Before commit fb041bb7c0a9 ("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t"), default builds implemented refcount_inc_not_zero() using atomic_add_unless(), which provided full memory ordering on success. The commit removed that ordering on weakly ordered architectures, allowing accesses after a successful reference acquisition to be reordered before it.
Use refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() in the IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups and in inet_twsk_purge(), where the socket is validated again after taking a reference.
bpf_sk_assign() can receive a socket pointer obtained through BTF without a reference. Use acquire ordering when it takes its own reference for a refcounted socket.
Use refcount_set_release() when setting refcounts in the SYN cookie, TCP Fast Open, request migration, and TIME_WAIT paths. Keep the existing TIME_WAIT smp_wmb(), which separately orders the refcount store before ehash publication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99676"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:02Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: restore refcount ordering for lockless socket access\n\nBefore commit fb041bb7c0a9 (\"locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations\nof refcount_t\"), default builds implemented refcount_inc_not_zero() using\natomic_add_unless(), which provided full memory ordering on success. The\ncommit removed that ordering on weakly ordered architectures, allowing\naccesses after a successful reference acquisition to be reordered before\nit.\n\nUse refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() in the IPv4 and IPv6 established\nlookups and in inet_twsk_purge(), where the socket is validated again\nafter taking a reference.\n\nbpf_sk_assign() can receive a socket pointer obtained through BTF\nwithout a reference. Use acquire ordering when it takes its own reference\nfor a refcounted socket.\n\nUse refcount_set_release() when setting refcounts in the SYN cookie,\nTCP Fast Open, request migration, and TIME_WAIT paths. Keep the existing\nTIME_WAIT smp_wmb(), which separately orders the refcount store before\nehash publication.",
"id": "GHSA-pw2h-9h4h-hf7q",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:07Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52f5a5ab318f5b120eb686069fbd0108016c02b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b5d8f351dd96f56a58bb516a80e2d4d742fe4e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f4fc93f76cd8ebd3c89a064573715503048d1ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddd14d0b5b5e650077779d9a158cb7a80ee8297b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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