GHSA-PRPM-W567-3RVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: prevent TX_RING byte count overflow
tpacket_snd() drains every SEND_REQUEST frame in a TX ring and adds each valid packet length to the signed int len_sum. Userspace can recycle completed frames concurrently, so a single blocking send call is not bounded by the ring size.
After enough successful transmissions len_sum wraps into the negative range. In particular, 65536 65535-byte frames followed by a 65007-byte frame produce 0xfffffdef, or -EIOCBQUEUED. sock_sendmsg_nosec() treats that as an impossible return and triggers a BUG. On systems configured to panic on oops, a CAP_NET_RAW holder can panic the host kernel.
Stop before the next frame would make the byte count exceed INT_MAX. The positive short count leaves that frame pending for a later send call.
A two-thread TPACKET_V2 reproducer triggered the BUG on an arm64 build of Linux 7.3-rc4. With this change, the same reproducer returned the expected positive short count without an oops.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98850"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:39Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: prevent TX_RING byte count overflow\n\ntpacket_snd() drains every SEND_REQUEST frame in a TX ring and adds\neach valid packet length to the signed int len_sum. Userspace can\nrecycle completed frames concurrently, so a single blocking send call\nis not bounded by the ring size.\n\nAfter enough successful transmissions len_sum wraps into the negative\nrange. In particular, 65536 65535-byte frames followed by a 65007-byte\nframe produce 0xfffffdef, or -EIOCBQUEUED. sock_sendmsg_nosec() treats\nthat as an impossible return and triggers a BUG. On systems configured\nto panic on oops, a CAP_NET_RAW holder can panic the host kernel.\n\nStop before the next frame would make the byte count exceed INT_MAX.\nThe positive short count leaves that frame pending for a later send\ncall.\n\nA two-thread TPACKET_V2 reproducer triggered the BUG on an arm64 build\nof Linux 7.3-rc4. With this change, the same reproducer returned the\nexpected positive short count without an oops.",
"id": "GHSA-prpm-w567-3rvc",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cf81fc9505b148b1b70068303ea6ea4b1212403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69ca64bbb528898916f309552053c32a04a36ebc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fd63d284e251332f4874ef9023cde472f315f86"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be12b221c0301111eeb023be04add3c6ad7c21fe"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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