GHSA-PR33-38XX-6R26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:16 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:16Impact
The previous BasicCookieStorage did not enforce RFC 6265 scoping rules around cookie domain, path, and Secure attribute. A client using a single storage instance to talk to multiple origins could have cookies leak across domains, or have Secure cookies sent over plain HTTP — the deprecation message states it bluntly: "BasicCookieStorage has no domain/path/scheme scoping and leaks cookies across origins. Use DefaultCookieStorage instead."
Who is affected: any client using BasicCookieStorage directly with cookies for more than one origin or scheme. Single-origin uses are unaffected.
Patches
| Line | Fixed in | Edition |
|---|---|---|
| v6.x (Community) | 6.48.0.0 | Community |
| v5.x (LTS) | 5.42.0.0 | Enterprise — contact enterprise@http4k.org |
| v4.x (LTS) | 4.51.0.0 | Enterprise — contact enterprise@http4k.org |
The fix introduces DefaultCookieStorage (RFC 6265 compliant) as the drop-in default; BasicCookieStorage is renamed InsecureCookieStorage and remains available for callers with a deliberate need for the old behaviour.
Workarounds
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:
- Use a dedicated BasicCookieStorage instance per origin / scheme, or
- Switch to a separate RFC 6265-compliant cookie store implementation.
References
- Fix release: v6.48.0.0
- Cookie storage rewrite:
6a9b44d743 - Background: RFC 6265 — HTTP State Management Mechanism
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.48.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.42.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.51.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:16:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe previous `BasicCookieStorage` did not enforce RFC 6265 scoping rules around cookie domain, path, and `Secure` attribute. A client using a single storage instance to talk to multiple origins could have cookies leak across domains, or have `Secure` cookies sent over plain HTTP \u2014 the deprecation message states it bluntly: *\"BasicCookieStorage has no domain/path/scheme scoping and leaks cookies across origins. Use DefaultCookieStorage instead.\"*\n\n**Who is affected:** any client using `BasicCookieStorage` directly with cookies for more than one origin or scheme. Single-origin uses are unaffected.\n\n### Patches\n\n| Line | Fixed in | Edition |\n|------|----------|---------|\n| v6.x (Community) | **6.48.0.0** | Community |\n| v5.x (LTS) | **5.42.0.0** | Enterprise \u2014 contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) |\n| v4.x (LTS) | **4.51.0.0** | Enterprise \u2014 contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) |\n\nThe fix introduces `DefaultCookieStorage` (RFC 6265 compliant) as the drop-in default; `BasicCookieStorage` is renamed `InsecureCookieStorage` and remains available for callers with a deliberate need for the old behaviour.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:\n- Use a dedicated `BasicCookieStorage` instance per origin / scheme, or\n- Switch to a separate RFC 6265-compliant cookie store implementation.\n\n### References\n\n- Fix release: [v6.48.0.0](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.48.0.0)\n- Cookie storage rewrite: [`6a9b44d743`](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/6a9b44d743)\n- Background: [RFC 6265 \u2014 HTTP State Management Mechanism](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6265)",
"id": "GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:16:07Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:16:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/security/advisories/GHSA-pr33-38xx-6r26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/6a9b44d743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6265"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.48.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "http4k: BasicCookieStorage` (renamed `InsecureCookieStorage`) did not enforce RFC 6265 cookie scoping; new `DefaultCookieStorage` is now the default"
}
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