GHSA-PR28-3MCX-GCMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Skip vport under deletion in report ID acquisition

qla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling walks ha->vp_list under vport_slock, takes a vref_count on the matching vport and calls qla_update_host_map() to register its port id.

A vport teardown via qla24xx_vport_delete() sets VPORT_DELETE, then qla24xx_disable_vp() removes the vport from the host_map btree and zeroes vha->d_id (RESET_AL_PA). The vport is only unlinked from vp_list later, in qla24xx_deallocate_vp_id(), which clears vp_map[idx] (RESET_VP_IDX) but does not touch host_map. In the window in between, report ID acquisition can still find the vport on vp_list and call qla_update_host_map(); with d_id already zeroed it takes the btree_insert32() path and re-inserts the dying vport into host_map. Nothing cleans that entry afterwards, so once scsi_host_put() frees the vha a later host_map lookup dereferences freed memory.

Skip a vport that has VPORT_DELETE set before taking the reference, so it is neither re-registered nor scheduled for DPC re-registration. This mirrors the existing guard in qla2x00_alert_all_vps().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-97531"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Skip vport under deletion in report ID acquisition\n\nqla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling walks ha-\u003evp_list under\nvport_slock, takes a vref_count on the matching vport and calls\nqla_update_host_map() to register its port id.\n\nA vport teardown via qla24xx_vport_delete() sets VPORT_DELETE, then\nqla24xx_disable_vp() removes the vport from the host_map btree and zeroes\nvha-\u003ed_id (RESET_AL_PA). The vport is only unlinked from vp_list later,\nin qla24xx_deallocate_vp_id(), which clears vp_map[idx] (RESET_VP_IDX)\nbut does not touch host_map. In the window in between, report ID\nacquisition can still find the vport on vp_list and call\nqla_update_host_map(); with d_id already zeroed it takes the\nbtree_insert32() path and re-inserts the dying vport into host_map.\nNothing cleans that entry afterwards, so once scsi_host_put() frees the\nvha a later host_map lookup dereferences freed memory.\n\nSkip a vport that has VPORT_DELETE set before taking the reference, so it\nis neither re-registered nor scheduled for DPC re-registration. This\nmirrors the existing guard in qla2x00_alert_all_vps().",
  "id": "GHSA-pr28-3mcx-gcmr",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T12:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20bb54601d2655e83795b73499c89f6b1cb31016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23582731afa35031c94fadb71a4f3b4afd094649"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40dcd4a71a52414b47fbba2f956387f1077c6c15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a83979d92782f83c90888ebe19bdc9420521940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ac7e0f454c7d52c0c2e5ecaf5a3d938f1b166d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d61e8de98c5a52978fb1edd95fe4dde3131b280e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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