{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools\u0027 documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers.\n\n### Details\nSeveral tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as `\"24h\"` timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use `//` line comments (documented in the [Dynatrace DQL language reference](https://docs.dynatrace.com/docs/discover-dynatrace/platform/grail/dynatrace-query-language/dql-reference)) to discard the rest of the intended query.\n\nThe marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator\u0027s token also exposes `execute_dql` with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools\u0027 contract: the `readOnlyHint: true` annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., `| fields id, name, type`), the display caps (`maxProblemsToDisplay`, `maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay`, `maxEntitiesToDisplay`), and the time-window bounds.\n\nThe vulnerable interpolations are:\n\n| File | Line | Parameter | Interpolation |\n|------|------|-----------|---------------|\n| `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 23 | `entityNames[]` | `` `fetch ${entityType} \\| search \"*${entityNames.join(\u0027*\" OR \"*\u0027)}*\" \\| fieldsAdd entity.type \\| expand tags` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 41 | `entityNames[]` | `` `smartscapeNodes \"*\" \\| search \"*${entityNames.join(\u0027*\" OR \"*\u0027)}*\" \\| fields id, name, type` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-problems.ts` | 27 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts` | 19 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts` | 11 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 20 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 27 | `clusterId`, `kubernetesEntityId` | `` `\\| filter k8s.cluster.uid == \"${clusterId}\" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == \"${kubernetesEntityId}\"` `` |\n\nAll Zod schemas for these parameters use `z.string()` or `z.array(z.string())` with no pattern validation.\n\n### PoC\n**`clusterId` - quote-and-comment break-out.** With `clusterId = \u0027x\" or 1==1 //\u0027` the constructed query becomes:\n\n```\n| filter k8s.cluster.uid == \"x\" or 1==1 //\" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == \"\"\n```\n\nThe first `\"` closes the string literal, `or 1==1` neutralises the filter to match every row, and `//` discards the rest of the line including the `kubernetesEntityId` guard.\n\n**`entityNames` - pipeline-stage injection.** With `entityNames = [\u0027svc\" | fields id, name, tags //\u0027]` the constructed smartscape query becomes:\n\n```\nsmartscapeNodes \"*\" | search \"*svc\" | fields id, name, tags //*\" | fields id, name, type\n```\n\nAfter the `//` line comment, the effective query is `smartscapeNodes \"*\" | search \"*svc\" | fields id, name, tags`. The original `| fields id, name, type` stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker\u0027s field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool\u0027s documented output contract).\n\n**`timeframe` - prefix injection.** With `timeframe = \u002730d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //\u0027` the list-problems query becomes:\n\n```\nfetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now()\n| filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate)\n...\n```\n\nA new pipeline stage is injected before the tool\u0027s intended `| filter`, and the rest of the query is commented out.\n\nThe server\u0027s own `verify_dql` tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL.\n\n### Impact\n- A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools\u0027 field-scope, time-window, and display caps.\n- The affected tools are annotated `readOnlyHint: true`, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a \"safe\" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface.\n- No new data access beyond what `execute_dql` already provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation.",
  "id": "GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/pull/562"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/commit/15d3546c0618ffbaeaeca477337e08e92f2151bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server has a DQL injection via parameters not documented as DQL"
}