GHSA-PQG5-73MW-QFJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix BSG job leak on validate flash image error path
qla28xx_validate_flash_image() returns QLA_SUCCESS (0) unconditionally, telling the FC BSG transport (fc_bsg_host_dispatch()) that the driver owns and will complete the request. But bsg_job_done() is guarded by "if (!rval)", so on the error path (rval == -EINVAL) neither the driver nor the transport completes the job. The request dangles until it times out, leaking block layer resources.
Commit c2c68225b145 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double free") added the "if (!rval)" guard to a batch of BSG handlers. That is correct for handlers that also return the error code (the transport then completes the job once via fail_host_msg), but this function returns QLA_SUCCESS unconditionally, so the guard turned a correct single completion into a leak.
Always call bsg_job_done(): bsg_reply->result is DID_OK and the error is reported in vendor_rsp[0], and since the function returns 0 the transport will not complete the job a second time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Fix BSG job leak on validate flash image error path\n\nqla28xx_validate_flash_image() returns QLA_SUCCESS (0) unconditionally,\ntelling the FC BSG transport (fc_bsg_host_dispatch()) that the driver\nowns and will complete the request. But bsg_job_done() is guarded by \"if\n(!rval)\", so on the error path (rval == -EINVAL) neither the driver nor\nthe transport completes the job. The request dangles until it times out,\nleaking block layer resources.\n\nCommit c2c68225b145 (\"scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double\nfree\") added the \"if (!rval)\" guard to a batch of BSG handlers. That is\ncorrect for handlers that also return the error code (the transport then\ncompletes the job once via fail_host_msg), but this function returns\nQLA_SUCCESS unconditionally, so the guard turned a correct single\ncompletion into a leak.\n\nAlways call bsg_job_done(): bsg_reply-\u003eresult is DID_OK and the error is\nreported in vendor_rsp[0], and since the function returns 0 the\ntransport will not complete the job a second time.",
"id": "GHSA-pqg5-73mw-qfjw",
"modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb52cc632464b0cd07f970341330466d772efe1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e25241f9fa01fb0c088381a156d84a725b71c1ef"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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