GHSA-PPQ5-HH8R-QQHH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: don't touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error()

skb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone shares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop. Through a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight.

Open vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC: clone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone() does not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early on SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker from the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery decrypts in place over frags it does not own privately.

Skip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears the zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80977"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: skbuff: don\u0027t touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error()\n\nskb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears\nSKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears\nSKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone\nshares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop.\nThrough a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops\nSKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight.\n\nOpen vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC:\nclone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while\ndo_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone()\ndoes not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early\non SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker\nfrom the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery\ndecrypts in place over frags it does not own privately.\n\nSkip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears\nthe zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes.",
  "id": "GHSA-ppq5-hh8r-qqhh",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:21Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80977"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0370da114a9bc044e248b85c6809d1b5e0c1f7f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15aa81b390d401abf4b8211042470e9e92e3b7fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/288f9970670841044ab030104fa6b6ed159949d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/363c4252ffc473a0203e91b83ede5519dfb8bd07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6493165034bca14033bf49c9cec7b45e97a91497"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ec22afc82a3cae07ade0a6ec361ae2532128ff5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4452349dcf4d561e13be768d5d278de58248930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f66bdb1cc0fcd227a062378f8be0b5873aa5600a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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