GHSA-PP4W-65W8-F5F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-28 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown
nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without serializing against target-side queue teardown.
If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request (ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue reference under state_lock.
If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a second kref_put() on an already released queue.
The ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has already moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still overwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the window for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference.
Fix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with state_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started.
Use -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather than propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep nvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before honoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the existing release path completes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46135"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T10:16:29Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown\n\nnvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue-\u003estate after sending an\nInitialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without\nserializing against target-side queue teardown.\n\nIf an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request\n(ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown\nmay start in softirq context before io_work drains the already\nbuffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue()\nsets queue-\u003estate to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue\nreference under state_lock.\n\nIf io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can\nstill overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the\nDISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and\nallows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a\nsecond kref_put() on an already released queue.\n\nThe ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has\nalready moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still\noverwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the\nwindow for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference.\n\nFix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with\nstate_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started.\n\nUse -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather\nthan propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep\nnvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before\nhonoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the\nexisting release path completes.",
"id": "GHSA-pp4w-65w8-f5f3",
"modified": "2026-05-28T12:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T12:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49891c8fe0cb43fbbe480da1cdccfbbaeb820cb3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5293a8882c549fab4a878bc76b0b6c951f980a61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67e1aaf93b495c2f10bc8a5fbba575fbb7f449b6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcfe4d1f7960e7d1c01642318f3aae1a604f8508"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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