GHSA-PM9C-RRJM-4V2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-04 09:30 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/s390: Fix memory corruption when using identity domain
zpci_get_iommu_ctrs() returns counter information to be reported as part of device statistics; these counters are stored as part of the s390_domain. The problem, however, is that the identity domain is not backed by an s390_domain and so the conversion via to_s390_domain() yields a bad address that is zero'd initially and read on-demand later via a sysfs read. These counters aren't necessary for the identity domain; just return NULL in this case.
This issue was discovered via KASAN with reports that look like: BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in zpci_fmb_enable_device when using the identity domain for a device on s390.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-39939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-04T08:15:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/s390: Fix memory corruption when using identity domain\n\nzpci_get_iommu_ctrs() returns counter information to be reported as part\nof device statistics; these counters are stored as part of the s390_domain.\nThe problem, however, is that the identity domain is not backed by an\ns390_domain and so the conversion via to_s390_domain() yields a bad address\nthat is zero\u0027d initially and read on-demand later via a sysfs read.\nThese counters aren\u0027t necessary for the identity domain; just return NULL\nin this case.\n\nThis issue was discovered via KASAN with reports that look like:\nBUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in zpci_fmb_enable_device\nwhen using the identity domain for a device on s390.",
"id": "GHSA-pm9c-rrjm-4v2f",
"modified": "2026-01-27T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2025-10-04T09:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17a58caf3863163c4a84a218a9649be2c8061443"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3506e9bcc777ed6af2ab631c86a9990ed97b474"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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