{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:54:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.\n\nBecause default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account.\n\nThis is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version checked: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Fixed on `main`: March 7, 2026 in `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73`\n- Patched release: `2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nThe affected path was:\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393` resolved `accountId` and read store state with it\n- `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702` and `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733` wrote store state without passing `accountId`\n- `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234` and `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554` still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the `default` account\n\nThe fix scopes `/allowlist ... --store` writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization\n- Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run `/allowlist` edits\n- Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into `default`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` \u2014 scope `/allowlist ... --store` writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals\n\n### Release Process Note\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T19:54:08Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T19:54:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping"
}