GHSA-PJMQ-J37R-3MM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet
tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing anything to the defragmentation engine:
if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &frag);
else
err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &frag);
if (err || !frag)
return err;
tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM; tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.
tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the ownership-transfer exit:
err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p->zone, &defrag);
if (err)
goto out_frag;
...
out_frag: if (err != -EINPROGRESS) tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&c->common); return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;
TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.
Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still owned by us. Tell the caller which of those it is, and free the packet ourselves in the last case, which restores the TC_ACT_SHOT behaviour that predated the Fixes: commit.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6 with a 54-byte frame carrying a 40-byte IPv6 header with nexthdr = 0 (hop-by-hop) and nothing after it, on a clsact ingress chain with "action ct". kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet; with this patch it reports none.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet\n\ntcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing\nanything to the defragmentation engine:\n\n\tif (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)\n\t\terr = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, \u0026frag);\n\telse\n\t\terr = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, \u0026frag);\n\tif (err || !frag)\n\t\treturn err;\n\ntcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;\ntcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of\nthem frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.\n\ntcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the\nownership-transfer exit:\n\n\terr = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-\u003ezone, \u0026defrag);\n\tif (err)\n\t\tgoto out_frag;\n\t...\nout_frag:\n\tif (err != -EINPROGRESS)\n\t\ttcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(\u0026c-\u003ecommon);\n\treturn TC_ACT_CONSUMED;\n\nTC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller\nfrees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and\ntcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The\nskb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per\nmalformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented\nfor these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.\n\nThree different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be\nqueued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by\nnf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still owned by us. Tell the caller which of\nthose it is, and free the packet ourselves in the last case, which\nrestores the TC_ACT_SHOT behaviour that predated the Fixes: commit.\n\nReproduced on v7.2-rc6 with a 54-byte frame carrying a 40-byte IPv6\nheader with nexthdr = 0 (hop-by-hop) and nothing after it, on a\nclsact ingress chain with \"action ct\". kmemleak reports one leaked\n232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per\npacket; with this patch it reports none.",
"id": "GHSA-pjmq-j37r-3mm4",
"modified": "2026-08-25T06:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23e97d594ddd0153020c506d5041048fbde1beb4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/439d3e404f9d5e515911cc8132cde198b337c19e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47d99828591d0fe8be4b9c8992ff3b8e47968db9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/737873a59905a54ca0d2d127ef882f3f88bf4379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a7ed561671aa6a911a2de99e59ef670a4d0b1df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b47bb899e04b5407c5a63fe88d4b6676586a6e84"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5dbecc2016e1692fd1c2532af9c41ba729cb747"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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